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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The growing incidence and impact of financial crises warrants an exceptional policy re-
sponse that adapts traditional approaches of financial supervision and crisis management to 
the changing structure of the international financial system.  Many financial reform meas-
ures have been proposed in response to the global financial crisis to address weak regula-
tion and supervision, bank resolution regimes, and repaying taxpayers mainly in developed 
countries. However, a more holistic approach to regulation, supervision and crisis manage-
ment is needed that attempts to control excessive risk-taking whilst mitigating and paying 
for the tremendous social costs imposed by the crisis.  This requires not only a redesigned 
macro-prudential regulatory framework, but also the creation of durable and sustainable 
mechanisms to enhance burden-sharing between the public and financial sectors and global 
solidarity measures that require the financial sector to provide direct assistance to those 
most vulnerable and severely affected by the crisis. 
 
The analysis and proposals in this report – Crisis Management, Burden Sharing and Solidar-
ity Mechanisms in the EU – provide a follow-up to our earlier study - Financial Supervision 
and Crisis Management in the EU (2008).  In our earlier study, we examined the origins of 
the 2007 credit crisis and how financial innovation through securitisation and credit deriva-
tives had created inter-connected and opaque wholesale capital markets in which banks 
and other financial firms had taken on high leverage to invest in securitised investments 
and synthetic credit instruments and when liquidity suddenly evaporated the system was 
put at great risk.  We argued that the similarity in bank risk management models that was 
facilitated by Basel II had led most banks to price credit and market risks in very similar 
ways which did not take into account the correlations between asset prices and investor 
behaviour.  This exposed banks to liquidity risks in the wholesale funding markets which 
were not addressed adequately by prudential regulation and supervision.  Moreover, EU 
institutions – and in particular the Level 3 Lamfalussy Committees – were inadequate insti-
tutionally to monitor systemic risks and provide effective supervisory oversight of inter-
connected capital markets and cross-border banks in the EU. In addition, crisis manage-
ment procedures in the EU were vague and did not perform well in the crisis as member 
states retreated into their own jurisdictions and ring-fenced the assets of cross-border 
banks experiencing difficulties.  We called for more institutional consolidation of the Lamfa-
lussy committees and enhanced coordination and information exchange on macro-
prudential risks with the European Central Bank.   
 
This study extends our analysis further by examining some of the main risks that continue 
to threaten financial stability and whether recent regulatory initiatives are adequate in ad-
dressing the various manifestations of systemic risk in globalised financial markets and 
whether crisis management mechanisms and burden-sharing amongst EU states in paying 
for the costs of the crisis are adequate.  We conclude that serious weaknesses still 
remain in  the pr oposed regu latory reforms.  Specific ally, propos ed reforms to 
Basel II still rely too much on bank economic capital models with limited distribu-
tions of data th at are not cor related to  macroeconomic risk factors.  Counter-
cyclical capital requirements should be rules-based and linked to a common defi-
nition of the economic cycle across countries 1.1-1.2.       
 
The study consists of three chapters: Regulatory and Supervisory Challenges; EU Crisis 
Management, Burden Sharing, and International Initiatives; and Global Solidarity Mecha-
nisms and Financial Taxes.  In section 1.1, we examine the challenges and concerns of the 
proposed amendments to Basel II and whether higher levels of regulatory capital and 
tighter definitions of tier one capital and leverage caps will be adequate to protect banks 
during times of market distress.   
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As we argued in our first study, the credit crisis of 2007 was created by a liquidity crisis in 
the wholesale funding market for banks, and not because of bank under-capitalisation: 
market-based regulatory models fed off of market-based bank risk management models to 
drive up risk, especially during times of market uncertainty and dislocation.  Bank risk 
management reinforced the bankers’ preference for more risk by underestimating the po-
tential costs of the risks to shareholders and ignoring the systemic risks.  Bank risk models 
relied too heavily on recent data samples with a narrow distribution of outcomes, especially 
in subprime mortgages.  In this study, we examine the weaknesses of bank risk manage-
ment further and argue that the flaws in market–based risk management models can be 
addressed 1.2, in part, by a more structural approach to risk assessment that not only re-
lies on assessing internal measures and probabilities of default, but also by linking these 
measures to external structural factors in the economy, such as correlations in investor 
behaviour and volatility during extraordinary times.  Basel II and the EU Capital Re -
quirements Dir ective (CRD) should require further ch anges to ensure th at the 
market-based risk models are adjusted to incorporate more structural approaches 
to risk assessment 1.2.2 & 1.3.   
 
Moreover, counter-cyclical capital requirements will not be effective unless their calculation 
is based on a more formulaic rule-based framework that relies on a uniform definition of 
the business cycle across Europe. The study also argues that some of the Basel II proposals 
on the definition of tier one regulatory capital and leverage will be far more costly for Euro-
pean banks to implement and therefore may limit economic growth disproportionately in 
most EU countries in comparison with other countries, such as the United States.  We rec-
ommend that the EU allow, under pillar 2 of Basel II, a more flexible transition 
period for implementing st ricter tier  one capital rules and that the definition of 
tier one c apital i nclude c ertain con vertible in struments th at can  abs orb loss es 
during times of market distress.      
 
The study addresses the risks posed by ‘naked short selling’ and the proposed bans against 
certain derivatives 1.4.  Naked shorting generally refers to short-selling a financial instru-
ment without first owning or borrowing the security or confirming that the security can be 
borrowed.  In the CDS market the term is used to refer to the situation where the buyer of 
protection does not own the underlying credit risk.  Greece's recent sovereign debt prob-
lems have brought the naked short-selling debate into the limelight.  The study argues that 
the focus should not be on financial ‘products’ but rather on how you use the products.  
Financial products do not have original sin: we can do dangerous things with seemingly 
safe things, and safe things with seemingly dangerous ones.  Moreover, the process of de-
claring some products safe and some unsafe would incentivise innovators to use the safe 
products to engage in the previously unsafe behaviour, and that could be even worse if the 
safe products are under a less stringent regime because they have been declared safe.  
Nevertheless, we can sympathise with the argument that synthetic collateralised debt obli-
gations used with credit default swaps have very little economic value and, as is demon-
strated in the case of the Securities Exchange Commission v. Goldman Sachs, some in-
vestment banks have engaged in sharp practices which policymakers would like to prohibit 
but which are already illegal under securities law, such as spreading false or misleading 
information and certain types of shorting. 
 
We argue that policymakers should apply enhanced supervisory oversight and if necessary 
amend the market abuse and manipulation laws to make clearer what type of sharp prac-
tices in the CDS market should be restricted or prohibited, rather than banning certain in-
struments like ‘naked CDS’, but we recognize that bans would be far easier politically than 
a policy of active supervisory oversight against market abuse and manipulation, especially 
during times of market distress 1.4.2. Oddly enough, banning certain financial products 
may result in policymakers absolving themselves from the real responsibility of being fo-
cused on unsustainable behaviour in whatever form or product it takes. 
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In chapter 2, we welcome the European Commission’s proposals for creating a European 
System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) that links micro-prudential supervision and regula-
tion to a new European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) that is responsible for macro-
prudential oversight and assessment 2.0.  We examine the need for Europe to reform its 
bank resolution regime 2.2 and crisis management framework for sovereign debtors 2.4.  
The r ecent crisis demonstr ates that  Eur ope’s existing bank resolution regi me is 
inadequate for large  cross-border banks and th at a soverei gn debt res tructuring 
mechanism and a solidarity fund are needed for EU states experiencing liquidity 
and solvency problems that allows them to raise short-term financing while re-
structuring their debt.  The re is also a need for the consideration of h ow discre-
tionary policy might be conducted on a European scale in the event of severe cri-
ses.     
 
Regulatory pr oposals have  n ot addre ssed the  gr owing pr oliferation of fin ancial 
transactions in the over-the-counter de rivatives and forei gn exch ange mar kets 
and how this contributes t o complexity and opacity and thereby limits price dis-
covery and the effic ient distribution of risk.  Chapter 3 considers how to pay for the 
social costs created by the financial crisis by requiring the financial sector to pay their fair 
share of the crisis and help provide global public goods.   
 
Proposals for new financial taxes typically encompass three separable objectives. The first 
objective, limiting excessive risk-taking, is derived from the desire to price risk efficiently. 
In this case how the funds are used subsequently is not part of the agenda. The proposition 
that such funds might be used to build an insurance fund is a quite separate argument re-
lated not to mitigating the riskiness of financial transactions but to pricing accurately the 
implicit insurance provided to institutions too big to fail. The provision of assistance to 
those most affected by ill chosen risk-taking is a third component of an efficient pricing 
strategy.  Hence the objective of efficient pricing may be pursued by adopting all three 
goals at once, or by pursuing them separately. 
We consider the advantages and disadvantages of several types of financial taxes including 
a tax on bank balance sheets, a tax on currency transactions, and a tax on exchange 
traded and centrally-cleared derivatives transactions.  To be effective, these taxes must 
satisfy the following criteria: 1) administrative transparency in using existing clearing and 
settlement infrastructure and data networks, 2) the tax level should achieve a balance of 
economic benefits in terms of risk mitigation that does not significantly distort the market 
nor undermine liquidity; 3) while levied at a low enough rate to generate substantial reve-
nue, 4) and comply with applicable EU and international law.  We argue that the currency 
transaction tax (CTT), though subject to some concerns under EU law, is best suited to sat-
isfy these criteria (at a rate of one basis point or half a basis point) 3.2.  Under existing 
settlement structures, the Continuous Link Settlement Bank (CLS Bank) could withhold a 
small CTT on foreign exchange transactions 3.2-3.3. Although a more broadly defined fi-
nancial transaction tax (FTT) could potentially generate more revenue than the CTT, it 
would be subject to greater avoidance and circumvention under present regulatory re-
quirements because clearing systems are not yet as developed for these instruments as 
they are for the foreign exchange markets.  In the long-run, however, banks and dealers 
are increasingly required by regulators to clear and settle their transactions through these 
institutions and they derive substantial benefits from doing so in the form of reduced coun-
terparty risk, lower regulatory capital charges, and lower overall transaction costs.  These 
synergies would far outweigh the value of any small transaction tax that might be applied.     
 
Policymakers therefore should give more attention to th e role that taxes on the 
financial sector can play in curbing excessive risk-taking and in providing sustain-
able funding to absorb some of the direct and indirect costs of financial crises and 
in providing global public goods 3.1-3.2.     
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Avoidance of these taxes can be made much more difficult if the countries with the reserve 
currencies and leading financial centres adopted an international treaty in which they 
agreed to implement a tax in their own jurisdictions with support from their central banks 
who would monitor collection through an agreed financial intermediary, such as the CLS 
Bank for foreign exchange, or a central counterparty with responsibility for clearing deriva-
tives trading 3.2-3.3.  Moreover, the enforceability of any contract that forms the basis of 
a taxable transaction would not be recognised by any courts of participating jurisdictions 
unless the tax was confirmed as paid 3.7. 
 
The recent history of liberalised financial market suggests that financial crises are recurring 
more frequently and that traditional regulatory controls have failed to control systemic risk 
and that financial innovation will result in further circumvention of regulatory controls which 
will then plant the seeds for the next crisis.  Traditional regulatory measures have failed to 
keep pace with the risks posed by financial innovation, and the costs of crises are rising 
exponentially and will impose huge economic and social costs on both developed and de-
veloping countries for generations to come.  It is imperative therefore that we explore in-
novative sources of finance to help governments and societies absorb these huge costs 
while also providing additional revenue to pay for public goods in all countries.   
 
We recommend that EU policymakers consid er several fi nancial taxes: 1) a smal l 
tax (about 10 basis points, 0.1%) on EU sovereign bond issuance that would pay 
for a EU solidarity fund to assist countries experiencing liquidity crises and to pay 
for the related social costs of sovereign debt crises, 2) a currency transaction tax 
adopted at a low r ate of one basis point or half a basis point (0.01% or 0.005%) 
that would be  designed mainly to  pay for the soc ial costs of crises an d provide 
sustainable fin ance to p ay for  glo bal pu blic g oods, and  3)  a br oader fin ancial 
transaction tax on all centrall y cleared de rivatives transactions.  In addition, we 
suggest tha t if  th ose t axes are ad opted policymakers sh ould have ‘ext ra-fiscal’ 
authority to adjust the tax r ates in a flexible way that allows them to respond to 
financial innovations and market developments 3.1-3.5. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Financial market supervision and crisis management have traditionally been considered 
technical areas of market oversight that have escaped the fanfare of high politics and eco-
nomic policy.  The global financial crisis that began in 2007 and intensified in 2008 before 
transforming itself into a sovereign debt crisis in 2010 has put financial regulation and crisis 
management into the spotlight.  These crises have attracted much attention because of the 
tremendous social costs imposed on the economic system as a result of weak corporate 
governance in financial firms and major deficiencies in regulation and supervision.  The cri-
sis demonstrates the need to adopt a more holistic approach to financial regulation and 
supervision that involves linking micro-prudential supervision of individual banks with 
broader oversight of the financial system.  Liberalised financial markets also require more 
effective coordination between states in supervising markets both within Europe and inter-
nationally.  Although financial innovation can bring significant benefits to the economy, it 
can also lead to excessive and uncontrolled risk-taking that can impose substantial social 
costs on the broader economy and society.  Policymakers should therefore consider building 
institutional mechanisms that establish solidarity between the financial sector and all parts 
of society that are affected by financial risk-taking.  These institutional mechanisms should 
consist not only of effective regulatory and supervisory frameworks and crisis management 
operations but also reformed fiscal arrangements that require the financial sector to reim-
burse governments and societies for some of the social costs of financial risk-taking.  These 
fiscal arrangements can take the form of financial taxes that can generate revenue to pay 
for the direct and indirect costs of state and central bank support and to pay for public 
goods as well.  This form of burden sharing that requires the financial sector to pay for 
more of the costs of its risk-taking can provide a basis for building solidarity mechanisms 
between those who have benefitted greatly from financial globalisation and those who have 
suffered the costs of excessive financial risk-taking.  In this way, financial taxes can poten-
tially act as a catalyst to mobilise financial resources that can be used to pay for global 
public goods that will support the development of a more vibrant and prosperous financial 
sector and global economy.         
 
We demonstrated in our first study1, Financial Supervision and Crisis Management in the 
EU, that financial markets in Europe and most developed countries had moved away from a 
bank-based model of finance to a wholesale capital market model of finance which had 
brought diversification and increased liquidity to financial markets but also had introduced 
systemic risks to the financial system which regulators had failed to identify and control.  
We also showed that other more specific developments in globalised financial markets be-
ginning in the early 1990s had changed the nature of financial risk-taking and systemic 
risk.  First, was the development of the structured finance market and in particular the role 
of securitisation in decomposing and distributing credit risk to wholesale institutional inves-
tors who were seeking higher yield in a low inflation environment. Second, the dramatic 
growth of the credit derivatives market which made possible enhanced corporate balance 
sheet management, but allowed traders to take excessive risks on the underlying assets in 
these contracts.  And, third, the role of technology and statistical theory in the use of 
value-at-risk (VAR) models in risk management, which allowed financial firms to calculate 
how much they expected to lose if the markets turned sharply against them. These struc-
tural changes in financial markets provided the ingredients that allowed risk to be under-
priced and shifted around the financial system, thereby making it difficult for regulators to 
monitor the risk and assess its potential impact on the financial system. 
   
The spread of risk throughout the wholesale capital markets was facilitated by the origi-
nate-rate-and-relocate model of securitised debt finance that had encouraged increased 
leverage across the financial system which in turn increased systemic risk.   
 
1 ‘Financial Supervision and Crisis Management in the EU IP/A/ECON/IC/2007-069) (Jan. 2008). 
7 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
In addition, the excessive use of credit default swaps and other credit-linked instruments 
had increased the complexity and inter-connectedness of financial markets and had sub-
stantially contributed to excessive speculation in the underlying assets of those instru-
ments, putting the system at serious risk.  Although primarily at fault, bankers and other 
market participants were not entirely to blame, as regulators had contributed to the liquid-
ity risks in the system, first by requiring mark-to-market valuation for all financial assets 
without regard to the duration of their funding and, second, by requiring regulated institu-
tions to manage their risk in a relatively standardised way that exacerbated herding during 
times of uncertainty.  The homogeneity of regulatory requirements contributed to the ho-
mogeneity of market practices through the use of similar risk models.  This had the effect 
of increasing systemic risk, and exacerbated the volatility in markets especially during 
times of market distress.     
 
Other factors contributed to the crisis, including the incentives of rating agencies to provide 
AAA ratings to complex debt instruments and their failure to use adequate risk-
measurement methodologies to assess the underlying risks embedded in these instru-
ments.   
 
In the study, we then turned to what type of institutional structure and supervisory ar-
rangements Europe should adopt to improve the regulation of systemic risk.  We concluded 
that the Lamfalussy supervisory framework was in need of updating because of the growing 
number of cross-border European financial institutions and the enhanced interconnected-
ness and complexity of wholesale capital markets.  This required increased consolidation of 
the Level 3 committees and formal status to be granted to the colleges of supervisors to 
oversee the cross-border operations of European banks.  In a subsequent study we rec-
ommended the creation of a single European clearing house to clear standardised credit 
derivatives and other derivative products in order to control systemic risk more effectively.2  
We also suggested further research on how Europe can build a more effective resolution 
regime to unwind failed financial institutions with extensive cross-border operations.     
 
Since our first study, many of our recommendations have been incorporated into EU finan-
cial legislation.  Our proposals for a review of Basel II and increased regulatory safeguards 
against liquidity risk were followed by amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive 
resulting in increased capital requirements for market risk and for EEA host country au-
thorities to approve bank risk models.3  Our proposal that those firms which originate, ar-
range and trade structured finance instruments to keep some ‘skin in the game’ with 
twenty percent exposure of the securitised debt was reduced to five percent in amend-
ments to the CRD.4  Following our study, the Van den Berg Report and EP resolutions were 
adopted in September 2008 proposing increased consolidation of the Level 3 supervisory 
committees and colleges of supervisors along with enhanced capital and liquidity framework 
for EU financial institutions.5  This follow-up study, Crisis Management, Burden Sharing and 
Solidarity Mechanisms in the EU, provides more analysis of some of these issues and con-
siders further areas of regulatory reform, both how EU policymakers might enhance their 
supervisory and crisis management practices and how to use solidarity mechanisms in the 
form of financial transaction taxes to enhance regulation and to pay for European and 
global public goods.         
 
                                                 
2  ‘Clearing and Settlement in the EU IP/A/ECON/IC/2009-001 (Brussels: European Parliament). 
3  Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up 
and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast),art. 131 (requiring host country authorities to approve 
the bank’s validation of its risk models). 
4 Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up 
and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast), art. 122a (requiring the originator or sponsor to disclose 
that it retains (on an ongoing basis) a 5 percent net economic interest). 
5 European Parliament, Report with recommendations to the Commission on Lamfalussy follow-up: future struc-
ture of supervision (2008/2148(INI), Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Rapporteurs: Ieke van den 
Burg and Daniel Daianu, A6-0359/2008.  
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Chapter 1 examines recent regulatory reforms proposed by the Basel Committee on bank 
capital, liquidity and leverage and discusses the economic impact of these proposals on the 
European banking system.  Many banks operating in EU states that allow most regulatory 
capital to consist of ‘hybrid instruments’ will experience a large increase in the cost of regu-
latory capital because the amended Basel II and the Capital Requirements Directive will 
likely require that regulatory capital – both internationally and across Europe – have a 
more harmonised definition and consist mainly of tangible common equity.  We then ana-
lyse bank risk management and how the similarity between bank risk models and their fail-
ure to take into account macro-prudential risks contributed significantly to the crisis and 
the risks these models continue to pose to the financial system.  We propose a structural 
approach to risk management in which risk models are not only built on internal recent 
data samples with a narrow distribution of outcomes, but also link these measures to ex-
ternal structural factors in the economy, such as correlations in investor behaviour and the 
riskiness of assets over the business cycle.     
 
Chapter 2 welcomes the recent European regulatory initiatives and in particular the estab-
lishment of a new European Systemic Risk Board to conduct macro-prudential oversight 
and monitor systemic risk.  The way the ESRB discharges its responsibilities will have an 
important effect on its credibility and effectiveness in performing its macro-prudential over-
sight functions.  The European Supervisory Authorities will play an important role in over-
seeing member state supervisory practices and in establishing an effective network of col-
leges of supervisors.  However, the EU regime governing the resolution of large cross-
border banks based on home country control has become obsolete and merits reform.  
There  should be a more harmonised set of principles in EU law to govern the resolution of 
distressed financial institutions that would also cover non-bank financial firms that are sys-
temically important.  We also discuss the recent Greek sovereign debt crisis and the urgent 
need to establish an EU solidarity fund to assist sovereign debtors during liquidity and sol-
vency crises and to pay for other social costs arising from financial crises.       
 
Chapter 3 examines the role of financial taxes as a solidarity mechanism to enhance pru-
dential regulation by taxing excessive risk-taking and providing sustainable revenue to 
governments so that they can pay for the direct and indirect costs of financial crises and 
provide additional support for overseas development aid and global public goods.  Specifi-
cally, we consider a tax on foreign exchange transactions, a tax on exchange-traded and 
centrally-cleared derivatives and related financial products, and a tax on bank balance 
sheets.  Financial transaction taxes had already become widely used as a tax raising 
mechanism before the global crisis.  Since the 19th century, the United Kingdom has im-
posed a transaction tax on equity trading of 0.50% of the value of the shares traded. Other 
countries, including Brazil and Belgium, have adopted similar transaction taxes that apply 
to equity shares as well as to debt instruments.  The generally positive experience that 
these countries have had with these taxes suggests that such taxes can provide a depend-
able source of revenue in securities spot markets while not significantly limiting capital in-
vestment and market development.  We argue that similar transaction taxes can be applied 
to certain sectors of the financial markets that have profited immensely from financial glob-
alisation and have grown disproportionately in comparison to other sectors of the global 
economy.  The focus on transaction taxes reflects our concern that the proliferation of fi-
nancial transactions themselves has become a concern of regulators and that a significant 
portion of trading has been characterised as ‘socially useless behaviour’ (Turner, 2010).  
We agree with many regulators that new financial taxes can serve useful regulatory pur-
poses, such as the IMF’s recommendations to the G20 for a bank balance sheet tax and a 
tax on bank profits and remuneration (IMF 2010).  We believe however that to achieve our 
goals to limit excessive financial transactions and to provide sustainable sources of revenue 
to build burden sharing and solidarity mechanisms in Europe and globally, that policymak-
ers should consider a tax on financial transactions that targets the excessive growth of fi-
nancial activity.    
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Our data show that such taxes levied at a low level will not significantly distort financial 
markets and could potentially provide a sustainable source of finance for many govern-
ments and for international cooperation initiatives between states and international organi-
sations.  Certain types of FTTs may be more practicable and versatile than others in achiev-
ing regulatory objectives and paying for public goods.  We suggest that a global currency 
transaction tax (CTT) might perform a dual function of limiting excessive risk-taking in the 
foreign exchange markets, while raising revenue to pay for European and global public 
goods.  We also suggest that a broad-based FTT on exchange-traded and centrally cleared 
derivatives trading could limit excessive transactions, while also potentially generating high 
levels of revenue.  However, such a tax should not be implemented until most standardised 
derivative contracts have been migrated to clearing houses and they are subject to pruden-
tial regulation.  Finally, in addition to a CTT and FTT, we consider the utility of a global tax 
on bank balance sheets and conclude that such a tax if applied to banks in certain devel-
oped and developing countries would penalise banks whose balance sheets were generally 
well-managed and regulated before the crisis and therefore should not now be subject to 
such a charge.  Rather, taxes on the wholesale capital markets and foreign exchange mar-
kets applicable to the leading reserve currencies would be a more appropriate way to limit 
excessive financial risk-taking while generating consistent sources of revenue for public 
goods.  We also suggest that EU governments should apply a tax of one basis point on all 
sovereign bond issuance (national and sub-national governments) and that the revenue go 
to a European Solidarity Fund to help sovereign debtors with liquidity support and to re-
structure their debt during times of crisis. Based on our analysis, these taxes would not 
limit liquidity nor significantly reduce trading under most scenarios.     
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1. REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY CHALLENGES 
1.1 Basel II and beyond? 
In December 2009, the Basel Committee proposed substantial revisions to the Basel II 
capital regime.6  The new standards have been called ‘Basel III’ and are less reliant than 
the earlier Basel II standards on the banks’ internal risk models.7 Basel II’s main objective 
was to make regulatory capital more market sensitive and to approximate the economic 
capital that banks were already holding. Before the crisis, Basel II had been extensively 
criticised for under-pricing financial risk and thereby failing to take into account the social 
costs that bank risk-taking creates for the broader economy.8  Basel III attempts to ad-
dress these weaknesses by requiring that the instruments of regulatory capital absorb more 
losses and that Tier 1 capital contains a higher proportion of common equity, in contrast to 
the average minimum of two percent of risk-weighted assets under Basel II.  Basel III will 
also require banks to hold less ‘hybrid instruments’ (part debt, part equity) because these 
instruments did not absorb losses adequately in the crisis.  Instead, the Basel Committee is 
expected to permit banks to hold ‘contingent bonds’ as subordinated debt that transform 
automatically if the issuing bank has financial difficulties or if the broader financial system 
experiences stress.9  Basel III will also incorporate leverage ratios which are determined by 
the size of the bank’s balance sheet, but are not risk-based.  Unlike regulatory capital 
which is a charge on risk-taking, leverage ratios are cushions to be drawn upon by banks 
during times of market stress.  Also under consideration is some form of counter-cyclical 
capital charge requiring banks to hold more capital during the good years and less during 
the lean years.  This is intended to offset the current tendency for capital rules to encour-
age higher leverage during good times and insufficient leverage during bad times.   
 
1.1.1 Counter-cyclical regulatory capital and liquidity requirements 
A major weakness of Basel II and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) was that it was 
pro-cyclical.  Regulatory capital calculations were mainly based on the riskiness of bank 
assets: in an upturn, bank assets would appear healthy and attract a lower capital charge, 
while in a downturn, assets would appear riskier and attract a higher charge.  Regulators 
generally agree that this would exacerbate bank asset price movements and contribute to 
volatility in the market.  Instead, regulatory rules should impose counter-cyclical capital 
requirements, such as higher capital charges during a market upturn and lower charges 
during a market downturn.  The experience of using counter-cyclical capital rules - or dy-
namic provisioning – has been positive: Spain had dynamic provisioning rules that led to 
their banks having more capital available to absorb losses during the crisis than most other 
European banks.   
 
Basel III may also go a few steps furthers than counter-cyclical capital by limiting capital 
distributions such as dividends, buy-backs and bonuses.  It has also been suggested that 
broader macro-prudential measures such as leverage caps should be used to limit excess 
credit growth.   
 
6 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision ‘Consultative proposals to strengthen the resilience of the banking 
sector’ (BIS: Basel) (17 Dec. 2009); and ‘International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and 
monitoring - consultative document’ (BIS: Basel) (Dec. 2009).  
7 Although the proposed amendments to Basel II as set forth in the Committee’s June 2009 proposals and the 
December 2009 consultation proposals would substantially amend Basel II if adopted, they are technically consid-
ered to be amendments and not a new Basel Accord. Draft proposals for ‘Basel 3’ are now under negotiation. The 
tentative plan is for 2010 to be a year of discussion and refinement with final proposals due by the end of the 
year.  Phase-in and grand-fathering is planned for late 2012. Whilst this may seem far away, it is likely that some 
of the changes will be adopted sooner. This can be achieved either by national regulators invoking changes bank-
by-bank under Pillar 2 of Basel II; or, by banks voluntarily accelerating the timetable. 
8 See Alexander et. al (2006, 40-41), and Ward (2002). 
9 Flannery (2009) argues that regulators should require ‘contingent capital certificates’ that convert from debt to 
equity automatically when the issuing banks equity falls too low. But some argue that such convertible instru-
ments will be very expensive for banks to raise capital. 
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This could mean that many different types of hybrid instrument issues will be called over 
the next few years and replaced with common equity.  This last point sounds positive but 
begs the question of how it would be implemented.  It is also hard to imagine political en-
dorsement in countries that have bank-led finance systems and have allowed regulatory 
capital to consist mainly of hybrid instruments which, if converted to ordinary equity under 
Basel III, would dramatically increase the cost of capital, thereby limiting credit growth as 
the main driver of improving employment and GDP growth (See Chart 2). 
 
As far as bank liquidity and funding are concerned, it is likely that a new funding ratio will 
be proposed along with a measure of short-term liquidity buffers.  The goal here is to 
strengthen the short-term resilience of the banking sector as well as reducing funding im-
balances.  During the last decade in Europe, loans exceeded deposits by about €3 trillion.10  
In the UK, the gap was approximately £700 billion by the end of 2007 with 50% of the 
shortfall coming from overseas.11  Any new ratio would go beyond the loan-to-deposit ratio 
by weighing stability of funding versus liquidity of assets. 
 
1.1.2 Leverage   
Perhaps the most significant change relates to leverage.  Macro-prudential supervision will 
necessarily involve regulators in managing and overseeing systemic risk across the financial 
system. One way to do this is to monitor the aggregate levels of leverage and impose addi-
tional controls on banks depending on whether aggregate levels are breached.  The idea of 
a gross leverage limit (tangible equity to tangible assets) has been recently proposed in 
Europe, while having been in place for commercial banks in the US for many years (Chart 
1).  Basel I allowed capital to be calculated on the risk-weighted notional of assets where, 
for example, OECD sovereign risk had a weighting of zero thus attracting no capital.  
Hence, by having large holdings of sovereign bonds, a bank could boast a very strong regu-
latory capital ratio but very high leverage.  Basel II refined the risk weightings by linking 
them to credit ratings and allowing economic capital models which produced risk adjusted 
capital numbers: the lower the risk, the lower the capital.  But while the calculation of bank 
capital became more complex, the US retained the crude leverage limit that had been in 
place for so long.  US deposit-taking banks have had many problems over the last few 
years but excessive leverage was not one of them.  This problem was however acute for 
the US securities firms where much higher leverage was permitted by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, whilst also being tolerated for European banks who adhered to 
Basel II but in order to optimise capital usage, were allowed to take on higher levels of lev-
erage.   
 
As national regulators move towards a common response, one of the many challenges they 
face is the dramatically different bank leverage ratios in the US and Europe. As Chart 1 
illustrates, amongst the largest banks, leverage in Europe is more than double that in the 
US.  Should the US leverage limit of 4% (25 to 1 asset to equity ratio) be adopted the im-
pact on bank capital in Europe will be far greater than in the US.  Chart 2 shows the IMF 
estimates of capital needed to meet differing limits of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets 
and, on the right of the chart, to meet 4% limit of Tangible Common Equity to Tangible 
Assets.  To achieve this leverage target the IMF estimates that European banks would need 
to raise an additional €300 billion of new capital.  This would have an enormous effect on 
the existing ability of European banks, especially those in bank-led financial markets, to 
generate long-term economic growth. 
 
                                                 
10 See European Central Bank (2010). 
11 See also, Bank of England, Financial Stability Report 2009  (HMSO: London). 
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Chart 1: US and European Bank  
Leverage Ratios 
 
¹ at 3Q09. Source: Company reports, SNL, CreditSight 
 
Chart 2:  IMF Estimate of B ank Capital 
Needs 
 
 
Source: IMF staff estimates 
 
1.2 Risk management 
In our first study, we argued that the similarity in risk management models used by banks 
encouraged by the Basel II process had led most banks to price credit and market risks in 
very similar ways without regard to the systemic risks which their risk-taking and instru-
ments posed to the financial system.  Advances in technology and sophisticated data man-
agement, combined with the use of value-at-risk (VAR) models allowed financial managers 
to devise risk models that led them to believe that they were diversifying and spreading 
risk to investors capable of absorbing risk, while increasing bank profits through higher lev-
erage. Based on these models, banks developed the originate-rate-and-relocate model that 
allowed them to use sophisticated data management techniques to calibrate their risk ex-
posures so that they could transform credit risk (originated as mortgage loans) into in-
vestable debt securities that could be sold to institutional investors looking for higher yield 
in a low inflationary environment.  Regulators permitted banks to hold some of these debt 
securities in their trading books with lower capital requirements than would have been re-
quired with regular loans.  Regulators and central bankers12 were convinced that the so-
called ‘great moderation’ had resulted in low inflation, and the low interest rates created 
conditions that drove assets prices even higher.  Risk management models reinforced the 
bankers’ preference for more risk by underestimating the potential costs of the risks to 
shareholders and ignoring the systemic risks.  They relied heavily on recent data samples 
with a narrow distribution of outcomes, especially in subprime mortgages.     
 
                                                 
12 Alan Greenspan stated in March 2009 in testimony to a US Congressional Committee that  
“in August 2007, the risk management structure cracked. All the sophisticated mathematics and computer wiz-
ardry essentially rested on one central premise: that the enlightened self-interest of owners and managers of 
financial institutions would lead them to maintain a sufficient buffer against insolvency by actively monitoring their 
firms’ capital and risk positions.”  
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1.2.1 The flaws in risk management  
Over the past fifteen years, a common refrain during periods of financial dislocation, great 
and small, is that we need more risk management.  After fifteen years of considerable in-
vestment in risk management we need to ask why this investment has had so little pay-off.  
There are three fundamental reasons why common approaches to risk management proved 
inadequate and, more to the point, will always do so. Failure to address these issues in 
some way will lead us back to crisis. 
 
The first is that financial crises invariably take place after a boom, where there has been a 
collective and often genuine belief that, for some exogenous reason such as the arrival of a 
new technology, investment risks have fallen – or returns for a given risk have risen.  This 
becomes self-feeding as the resulting boom gives the statistical appearance that the risk-
return trade-off has improved, with generalized returns rising, and instances of default or 
other downside risks receding amid surplus liquidity. More statistical measures of risk and 
return will not help this problem. Indeed, the tendency to use more and more up-to-date 
data in assessing risks and returns or incorporating market measures of risk will tend to 
reinforce this self-feeding cycle (Persaud 2004).  Financial crashes occur because markets 
underestimate prior risks.  Using market estimates even more will make matters worse not 
better. At the same time, forcing banks, generally funded by short-term liabilities, to use 
more longer-term data on risk and returns and less market-sensitive data, will appear from 
the perspective of individual institutions to be perverse. This suggests that the solution to 
this risk management problem is best carried out at the macro level. 
 
The second reason, which is similar to but different from the first, is that the risk manage-
ment approach to the financial sector assumes statistical independence. When a firm’s risk 
management model signals that its risk exposure is too high and the firm decides to re-
spond to this by selling risky assets, it assumes that it holds different assets from other 
institutions and is getting a different signal from its risk model than others and so when it 
sells these assets there will be buyers and not only other sellers. One of the reasons why 
the approach assumes this is because to assume otherwise will mean that risk will be hard 
or impossible to compute. Moreover, risk would no longer be determined by factors internal 
to the risk models like prices and past volatilities and correlations of the assets in the port-
folio – but to things outside these risk models such as the behaviour of other investors. 
 
The response of individual institutions to this conundrum is that they should use a risk 
model with fatter tails. No doubt vendors of risk models, like vendors of all consumer prod-
ucts, like a bit of obsolescence and demand for the new product. But this will not work be-
cause the economy is never actually characterised by the average distribution, but by one 
of more separate distributions. The normal distribution works fine in the quiet times, but in 
periods of crisis with concentrated investments and increased liquidity demand, there is an 
altogether new and completely skewed distribution as everyone rushes for the exit at the 
same time. We are either in one or the other distribution – normal or skewed. Trying to 
average the two will make no meaningful difference: risks will appear to be overestimated 
for six out of every seven years, say, and substantially underestimated in the seventh. 
 
The third issue relates to risk management at the board level. Like Iraq dossier writers, 
chief executives and independent board directors have been quick to argue that they did 
not know what was really going on when they gave the order to leverage up. This is partly 
because the combination of “Risk and Audit” committees of the board has led to an “auditi-
sation of risk” where risks are identified and given a colour - red, amber or green.  The reds 
are fretted about and the greens ignored. This traffic light approach flies in the face of the 
observation that “it is not the things you think are dangerous that kill you” (Mark Twain). 
There is no shortage of financial victims citing some explosion as a “once in a thousand 
year event” or “wholly unforeseen and unpredicted”. 
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1.2.2 Micro and macro solutions 
The principal solution to these issues is for firms, but more importantly, regulators to take 
a more “structural” view and a less “statistical” view of risk. A statistical view of risk would 
be to say there is one thing called risk, and it is measured by the excess return relative to 
the risk-free return, the volatility of these excess returns, or a public credit rating. We 
should not need reminding in the wake of the current crash that such measures of risk are 
highly cyclical and prone to underestimation of future risk in quiet times and overestimation 
of future risks in the aftermath of a crash. The so-called “risk-sensitivity” approach to regu-
lation, which in practice meant a greater sensitivity to market prices of risk, amplified the 
boom-bust cycle when the purpose of regulation, at its least ambitious, should be to mod-
erate these cycles. 
 
A structural view of risk is one where we identify different kinds of risk: liquidity risk, credit 
risk, market risk, operational risk and we look at the capacity to absorb each risk. In a 
structural view of risk, a regulator may limit the ability of institutions without a capacity to 
absorb liquidity risk – such as short-term funded institutions – from holding those kinds of 
risks, and support the ability of firms with a capacity for absorbing this risk – like long-term 
funded institutions or those with long-term liabilities – to do so. Limits could be achieved 
through a capital regime in which capital is set aside for the degree of each risk mismatch: 
principally liquidity risk mismatch, credit risk mismatch, and market risk mismatch. This 
would be a 21st century update to Glass Steagall: fragmentation, not by activity, but by 
ability to absorb risk. 
 
A “structural” approach to risk would also embody the fact that the credit mistakes are not 
made in the recession but in the boom and, consequently, the amount of capital required to 
set against credit risk should be contra-cyclical. This is not to kill the cycle, but to offset the 
self-feeding aspect of the cycle where in the up-cycle risks appear low and so the amount 
of capital set aside falls or the fundamental amount of risks rises. We have discussed this 
before. A key issue is how the cycle is measured. Work at the FSB and Basel Committee 
suggests that the growth of GDP above trend is one of the best measures of excessive 
credit growth and should coincide with the application of some regulatory brake.  But in 
reality each cycle is different and a range of indicators should be used. That said, we should 
not use so many indicators that the signal is blunted and the decision to raise capital re-
quirements or not becomes discretionary, with the likely prospect that policy would then be 
too easily influenced by the perceived exceptionalism of each boom. 
 
1.3 Stress tests and concentration risks 
Another structural approach to risk is to consider concentration risks. A higher degree of 
concentration will mean that past measures of risk such as volatility and co-variance are 
likely to underestimate risks going forward. Investment concentration is perhaps best 
measured by central authorities, either regulators, trade reporting entities, both, or such 
alike. Regulators should require all financial market participants to submit to a common 
stress test at least twice a year. 
 
An example would be for financial firms to assume a 40% drop in house prices and report 
the implications for assets, liabilities, liquidity, etc. While a common stress test tends to 
underestimate spill-over effects, it provides more information on systemic risks than the 
results of millions of independent stress tests being carried out by individual institutions 
and may help the regulator to observe the rise of new interdependencies. 
 
In terms of improving risk management at the Board level, one way to get out of the box-
ticking trap is to separate Risk Committees of the Board from Audit Committees and give 
the Risk Committee some capital and ask it to hedge firm-wide risks. This will force the 
Risk Committee to analyse relevant factors other than the results of its risk models and 
make judgments on what risks are being run by the firm as a whole. 
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1.3.1 Too big to fail 
In recent months it has become fashionable to argue, in the words of Governor Mervyn 
King, Governor of the Bank of England, that if a bank is too big to fail it is too big. It is cer-
tainly the case that the bigger the institution, generally the bigger the systemic risks and so 
the greater the regulatory scrutiny and restraint ought to be. Large institutions also play a 
powerful lobbying role that can have systemically dangerous consequences. Our pre-
disposition is to prefer a more competitive market with smaller institutions. However, we 
are not convinced that requiring institutions to be smaller will solve the fundamental prob-
lem of boom-bust and it is probably as much an issue of competition policy as it is of finan-
cial stability policy. 
 
Many financial crises have had their roots in small institutions. For example, the 1973-4 
“Secondary Banking Crisis” in the UK that had an even greater impact on the stock market 
than the current crisis has had so far. In the current crisis, the large and staid institutions 
proved far more resilient than the fast growing, medium-sized ones. And it may well be 
easier to resolve a problem caused by excessive lending of one large institution than the 
excessive lending of a large number of small, yet correlated, institutions. Simply put, pri-
vate institutions should be required to internalize the systemic cost of them becoming 
large, but shrinking and breaking up banks is no panacea to financial crises. It may, how-
ever, be a welcome consequence of our recommendation to fragment the financial system 
by risk-capacity, achieved through higher capital requirements on bank size and risk mis-
matches.  This would put a higher regulatory cost on bank size and inter-connectedness, 
thus leading some institutions to shrink as they refocus on what they have the greatest 
capacity to do. 
 
1.4 Central counterparties and credit derivatives 
In recent decades financial intermediation has moved from institutions into markets and 
financial crises are now manifest in markets rather than institutions.  Market gridlock is the 
predominant manifestation of systemic risk and it is widely believed that a contributing fac-
tor is underperforming and poorly regulated clearing and settlement systems.  Although the 
existing infrastructure for clearing and settling derivatives did not fail during the recent cri-
sis, regulators and others clearly believe that management of risk could be improved.  One 
of the reasons for regulatory interest in centralised clearing is a hoped for improvement in 
pricing and price transparency.   
 
When confidence collapsed in Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) and Credit Default 
Swaps (CDSs) this was in part because no-one knew what their value might be. It was this 
lack of any basis of valuation that led to the questioning of the value of bank balance 
sheets. No-one knew what the value of assets held on the balance sheet was and hence no-
one knew whether the banks were solvent.  The problem was complexity not transparency: 
securitised instruments typically come with many pages of elaborate documentation, de-
scribing the character of the asset in detail – but even those who attempt to read it all sel-
dom understand it.   
 
It is also argued that due to the bilateral nature of Over-the-Counter (“OTC”) derivatives, 
the risk of a counterparty defaulting before the contract expires is relatively high, 
particularly for credit derivatives that generally have long maturities, making it more likely 
that a purchaser will be left unprotected.  In addition, collateralisation provisions in CDS 
contracts are not standardised and do not take account of how credit enhancement on one 
transaction affects risk exposures on related transactions.  A  further concern is that due to 
the nature of CDS contracts involving the referencing of other credit instruments and the 
posting of more collateral as default probability increases, a downturn is likely to cause a 
downwards spiral of pay outs and defaults, the type of which triggered the collapse of AIG 
in 2008. Finally, the customised structures of OTC instruments means that they are not 
typically susceptible to netting, resulting in high risk assessments (and collateral 
requirements) on gross positions. 
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It is these difficulties that have led to the now generally accepted policy conclusion that as 
many assets as possible should be forced into clearing systems and central counterparties 
(“CCPs”), facilitating price discovery and liquidity, standardising collateralisation provisions 
and encouraging the development of simpler “plain vanilla” assets that are susceptible to 
netting.  To date, the message from the regulators has been confusing: the UK Financial 
Services Authority has stated that although it supports the greater use of clearing it could 
not endorse forcing all “standardised” OTC contracts into CCP clearing.  By contrast, the US 
Congress is likely to approve a financial services reform bill in 2010 that will require all 
standardised OTC contracts to be centrally cleared by clearing houses or central counter 
parties.  Similarly, the European Commission has indicated that it may propose legislation 
requiring standardised OTC derivatives contracts to be subject to mandatory clearing.     
 
Aside from a more co-ordinated regulatory approach, the market needs some guidance on 
what is “standardised”.  There has been some regulatory discussion about how to incentiv-
ise the market to move away from OTC.  One idea is to increase the regulatory capital 
costs for OTC transactions or other types of risky short-term derivative transactions.  It is 
possible that certain hedge contracts relating to underlying credit-linked instruments or 
foreign exchange transacted in the OTC market will obtain less or possibly no regulatory 
capital relief. Therefore, we suggest that banks and other regulated institutions receive a 
reduced regulatory capital charge on their derivatives exposure for clearing OTC derivative 
trades through an approved central counter party or clearing house, while receiving a simi-
lar capital reduction for settling their foreign exchange transactions through the Continuous 
Link Settlement Bank (3.2)  or other approved entity.13    
 
1.4.1 Naked short selling 
Naked shorting refers to short-selling a financial instrument without first owning or borrow-
ing the security or confirming that the security can be borrowed.  In the CDS market the 
term is used to refer to the situation where the buyer of protection does not own the un-
derlying credit risk.  Greece’s recent sovereign debt problems have brought the long-
standing short-selling debate into the credit default swap arena.  As Greek sovereign credit 
spreads dramatically fluctuated with news of on-off bail-out plans, a number of senior 
European politicians have stated that the wider spreads were caused by CDS, and that this 
was increasing the cost for Greece to borrow and hence trading of CDS should be re-
stricted.  A similar debate has occurred regarding the sovereign debt financing needs of 
other European countries.  The harmful activity is thought to be “naked short selling” – 
shorting credit risk in the CDS market with no long-positions to hedge.  It has been sug-
gested that laying off credit risk using CDS should only be authorised if the hedging entity 
“owns the underlying” asset.  On 19 May 2010, the German government banned unilater-
ally the “naked” short-selling of eurozone government bonds, their credit default swaps 
(CDS) and the shares of the country’s 10 biggest financial institutions. 
 
There are many areas of misunderstanding in relation to the CDS market.  One of these is 
how credit risk management actually works.  The whole point of using CDS to manage bank 
risk is that credit risk comes in many shapes and sizes and most of it cannot be sold or di-
rectly hedged.  The introduction of CDS for hedging was transformative because it created 
a standardised unit of credit risk that could be sold (shorted) to offset a bank’s numerous 
non-standard credits.  By definition the CDS is rarely hedging “the underlying”.   
 
 
13 However, it should be noted that regulation by “price”, the capital charge, and by “quantity”, the legal 
requirement to trade on exchanges, are not perfectly equivalent. As was pointed out by Martin Weitzman in 
famous article entitled “Prices versus Quantities” published in 1974, the relative efficiency of price regulation and 
quantity regulation is dependent on whether the relative balance of benefits and costs. Where costs are relatively 
low and benefits high, price regulation is to be preferred. Where, as in this case, the costs of OTC complexity are 
high and the benefits relatively low, quantitative regulation is superior. See also, Haldane (2010). 
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It now transpires that CDS risk transfer was less than 5% of Greek debt and that the 
spread widening started in the bond market, not the CDS market.  The attraction of the 
CDS is that it is a proxy hedge offering payouts close to any loss that might follow a corpo-
rate bankruptcy.  A requirement to only exactly hedge underlying credit instruments (i.e. a 
ban on naked short selling) would put a stop to most bank hedging activity, which might 
have the perverse effect of limiting banks’ ability to hedge risk, especially in volatile capital 
markets. 
 
This debate highlights the widespread misconception concerning the relationship between 
price in the CDS market, the probability of default, and the impact of CDS activity on bond 
prices. Commentators are correct in stating that CDS contracts provide a form of insurance 
against default, but too often state that if the price goes up the market must believe that 
default probability has also increased.  In doing this, they fail to appreciate the activities of 
bank credit portfolio managers and bond portfolio managers.   
 
Banks monitor and manage credit limits as part of their standard risk management activi-
ties.  A German bank might impose a country limit on its exposure to the UK economy.  
That exposure would be made up of a wide range of exposures to UK banks and corporates.  
From time to time, the sum of the parts might exceed the country limit so the bank would 
need to take mitigating steps. One of these could be reducing its exposure to the UK gov-
ernment.  Buying protection on a sovereign borrower in the CDS market is considered ac-
ceptable risk mitigation.  Over the last two years the need to adhere to limits has become 
so important that users have paid prices that appear to make no economic sense.  
 
Another important use of the CDS is in the management of asset price volatility by fund 
managers subject to mark-to-market accounting.  The last two years have seen increased 
volatility and correlation in most asset classes: witness the global market reaction to prob-
lems in Dubai in late 2009.  To reduce excessive swings in portfolio valuations, the man-
ager of a corporate bond portfolio might choose to short an appropriate sovereign or index 
of sovereigns.  Any bond losses due to spread widening would be partially offset by gains 
from the CDS.  
 
Both these activities involve shorting credit risk in the CDS market but in neither case are 
the users taking or expressing a view on default probability.  They are forced to pay the 
market rate and since the universe of CDS investors has been reduced by the financial cri-
sis, from time to time supply and demand imbalances will raise the price. This is unlikely to 
have any impact on bond prices as investors in these markets are generally looking for a 
home for their cash.  Further, the net risk transfer numbers (not the gross numbers that 
are almost always quoted) in the CDS market are normally a fraction of a borrower’s bond 
issuance.  The important point here is that benign activities by bank credit portfolio manag-
ers can affect CDS spreads and send misleading signals to the market. 
 
1.4.2 Will the securitisation market revive?  
Securitisation has been used by banks and corporate since the 1970s when securities 
backed by pools of US residential mortgages were created and sold to investors.  Since 
then the assets that have been securitised have grown to include most forms of debt with 
particular focus on residential and commercial mortgages, consumer credit and corporate 
loans.  Up to the end of the 1990s the rationale for securitisation was balance sheet and 
risk management for the originator.  The last decade saw the rationale switch to the com-
position of investor demand and this contributed to the huge growth and ultimate collapse 
of the securitisation market.  By 2007, in order to provide compelling returns to yield hun-
gry investors, the arrangers resorted to ever increasing levels of complexity and leverage.  
The market ground to a halt in a matter of months resulting in two significant problems.  
First, hundreds of billions of dollars of existing securitisations had to be valued, written 
down and maybe sold in an environment where there were virtually no buyers.  
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Second, the assets that would normally be securitised now have to be held on bank balance 
sheets that are facing calls for less leverage and more capital. A restart of the securitisation 
market is considered key to fixing both of these problems.  
 
   Chart 3: European and US securitisation issuance 
 
    Source: SIFMA 
 
A glance at Chart 3 would suggest that the securitisation market has suffered but is now 
recovering.  However, this data is very misleading: most of the issuance in 2008 and 2009 
was bought, underwritten or funded by central banks.   For example, in Europe there was 
€417 billion of issuance in 2009 but only €8 billion (2.1% of total) was sold to end inves-
tors.  The bulk of issuance was kept by the issuer and posted to the central bank under a 
repurchase contract.  In 2008 only 1.2% of the €825 billion of issuance was sold to end 
investors.  In the US most new securitisations were either bought by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac or by the Term Asset Liquidity Facility (TALF). 
 
The extent of the problem is well illustrated by the ratings migration in the synthetic CDO 
market.  Chart 4 illustrates that sub-investment grade tranches grew from being a few per-
centages of total tranches in late 2007 to over 80% of outstanding by late 2009.  Not only 
does this suggest significant mark-to-market losses for holders of the paper but in many 
cases it suggests extensive forced selling.  Most investors would not have the authority to 
hold ‘BB’ or lower rated investments.  To make matters worse the main group of investors 
in CDOs – the banks – are facing higher capital charges for securitized products and calls 
for less leverage.  To date, sellers of CDOs are still plentiful and there is little sign of a 
slow-down in selling.  A reversal that results in significant net buying is unlikely in the me-
dium term.  
 
Given the apparent damage caused by securitisation and the resulting loud political and 
popular call for it to be severely restricted or even banned, commentators are asking 
whether we actually need securitisation.  Unfortunately, the rationale for such calls is a be-
lief that securitisation only exists to enrich the banks at the expense of investors. There is 
little appreciation for the benefits brought by securitisation that enables banks and other 
firms to manage their balance sheets more efficiently and to generate more liquidity to ex-
pand investment and output.    
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     Chart 4: Distribution of Ratings for CDO 
 
 Source: S&P, Morgan Stanley Research 
 
1.4.3 Reg ulatory Changes  
Due to the role of structured credit products in causing the credit crisis, regulators have 
responded with a range of possible regulatory changes.  Their main objective is to address 
at least two problem areas: first, since banks had no residual economic interest in the 
products that they were selling (referred to as “skin in the game”) there was no incentive 
to ensure their long-term robustness; second, since bank capital charges for holding CDOs 
were relatively small, banks accumulated vast holdings of CDO tranches which proved to be 
very illiquid and susceptible to material downward price adjustment. 
 
The introduction of a risk retention rule would ensure that the “securitizer” retains an eco-
nomic interest in a material portion of any asset used to back an issuance of securities.  
The actual definitions vary between Europe and the US.   In Europe the issue is addressed 
in the new Capital Requirements Directive and applies to originators, sponsors and original 
lenders.  An economic interest of not less than 5% will need to be retained for new deals 
issued from 2011 onwards and for all deals from 2015 onwards.  In contrast, the main pro-
posals in the US Congress would define ‘securitizer’ differently and would either adopt a 5% 
or 10% for the risk retention rule.   
 
At this stage it is not clear how the retention rule will affect the various parties involved in 
a CDO.  In a traditional “balance sheet” CDO where the arranger is a bank managing its 
own loan book not much will change since such an arranger would normally retain some of 
the risk.  The motivation for a balance sheet CDO is management of leverage, funding and 
capital – the profitability of the transaction itself is not the primary concern.   But in an “ar-
bitrage” CDO where an arranger sources the collateral in the secondary market and is only 
motivated by profit, the requirement to retain some of the risk could significantly reduce 
the arranger’s appetite for such transactions. 
 
Regarding risk weights,  the changes currently being considered will see most securitisa-
tions attracting higher capital charges and so-called resecuritisations incurring additional 
risk weights to account for higher risk, mainly due to concentration.  This change was 
prompted by the numerous problems seen in the securitisation market and particularly in 
the market for CDOs of Asset Backed Securities.  The proposals currently under considera-
tion raise two issues: first, the definitions are vague and hence the true impact is not 
known; second, regardless of definitional uncertainty, the impact on old and new securitisa-
tions will be material and not necessarily beneficial. 
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One of the definitional uncertainties relates to resecuritisations: some have interpreted it to 
apply to subordinated corporate debt instruments.  This could include leveraged loans and, 
if so, would result in dramatically increased capital charges for securitisations of such as-
sets.  This would affect both existing and new deals at a time when, as discussed in 1.1.2, 
we are approaching a significant refinancing bubble for leveraged loans. 
 
One of the material changes relates to trading books – the section of a bank’s balance 
sheet that holds relatively liquid assets and is subject to mark-to-market accounting.  Se-
curitised products held in the trading book used to attract lower capital charges due to the 
fact that any reduction in value would be identified on a daily basis via the profit and loss 
statement.  This distinction is set to disappear and hence many holders of securitised prod-
ucts in a trading book may be inclined to reclassify them as banking book items in order to 
avoid price volatility.  This will reduce liquidity in an already illiquid sector as intermediaries 
will be less inclined to hold inventory of securitised products. 
 
The other material change that merits discussion relates to counterparty risk.  It has been 
recognised that the relationship between a credit-risky derivative and a credit-risky coun-
terparty is complex and merits special treatment.  One such area of focus is referred to as 
“wrong way risk”: where the deterioration of the risk being hedged is accompanied by a 
deterioration of the counterparty’s credit quality.  In the future such a transaction would 
attract an additional capital charge.  It has also been suggested that there should be a mul-
tiplier for large bank counterparties and for counterparties that are not regulated.  Finally, 
there are plans to introduce capital incentives to encourage the market to use Central 
Credit Counterparties (“CCP”s).   
 
A troubling feature of the regulatory developments in this area is the apparent failure to 
appreciate the difference between “good” and “bad” securitisations.  Few would disagree 
that a product created solely to meet the return and rating goals of a specific investor is of 
little value if the goals can only be achieved through excessive complexity, leverage and 
abuse of shortcomings in rating agency models.  Significant issuance of products of this 
kind became a source of systemic risk and are rightly characterised as “bad”.  But where 
the product provides the arranger with effective methods for managing bank leverage, risk, 
capital and funding then, so long as any additional risks are well understood and can be 
controlled, most would agree that such securitisations could be “good” for the market.  Un-
fortunately, much of the basic workings of these products are similar and hence rules cre-
ated to limit bad securitisations may well restrict good ones too. 
 
1.5. The impact of regulation on credit markets 
The combination of a less levered banking sector and a diminished shadow banking sector 
raises the question of whether the medium term credit needs of the US and Europe can be 
met.  Given the economic down-turn it is no surprise that private sector credit growth has 
slowed.  Chart 5 shows the slowing growth in the US and Europe and the credit contraction 
seen in the UK during the first half of 2009.  IMF estimates of credit growth over the next 
five years shows a significant reduction compared to the previous decade.  However, public 
debt is growing and it may be that total funding needs are not met by supply.  A popular 
economic view is that credit rationing is a cause not a symptom of economic slowdown; if 
this is correct, then a shortage of credit presents a problem. 
 
It is difficult to predict how the credit needs of Europe and the US will evolve but a good 
place to start is to look at the refinancing of existing debt instruments.  Clearly this can 
overstate the problem to the extent that borrowers are deleveraging.  But it can also un-
derstate the problem by not addressing the migration away from banks and shadow banks 
to the bond market which, for reasons stated above, could become a bigger source of fi-
nance for the European economy. 
 
21 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
The market for emerging market debt exhibits a less troubling refinancing profile (Chart 6) 
with the peak in 2008 and 2009 not producing any noticeable market stress.  With debt 
service of bond and loans in 2010 and 2011 estimated at US$400 billion it is possible that 
this material demand for funds could divert cash from the US and European credit markets.  
However, the number of institutions that would divert money on an ad hoc basis from, for 
example, a US high yield risk exposure to add an emerging market exposure is few.  Such 
behaviour is probably the domain of risk-seeking investors.  The challenge to other markets 
will come if, at the institutional level, asset allocations are materially adjusted to reflect the 
growing importance of emerging markets relative to most other markets. 
 
Chart 5: Private Sector Credit Growth  
 
Source: IMF staff estimates 
 
Chart 6 : R efinancing ne eds of 
emerging mark et forex-denominated 
corporate debt 
 
Source: Bloomberg L.P.; IMF 
 
 
It appears that increased regulatory requirements along with a fragile economic recovery 
combined with the prospect of increased competition from Asian banks will limit the capac-
ity of European banks to raise capital and thereby also limit their ability to make loans to 
European businesses and consumers.  This is not helped by IMF estimates of a reduction of 
bank lending during 2010 (Chart 7).  But this has to be put in the context of the ability of 
market sentiment to change rapidly and the considerable and growing pools of cash looking 
for higher yielding returns. 
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     Chart 7: Bank lending capacity growth 
 
     Source: IMF 
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2. EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT, BURDEN SHARING AND IN-
TERNATIONAL INITIATIVES  
2.1 European financial market supervision  
The European Commission’s proposals to establish a European System of Financial Supervi-
sors (ESFS) and a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) are premised on the importance 
of linking micro-prudential supervision and regulation to the macro-prudential oversight of 
the financial system.14  Indeed, the linkage is essential for building an efficient EU supervi-
sory regime that allows member states to exercise more effective supervisory oversight 
over individual firms and investors, while monitoring and measuring systemic risk in the 
broader European financial system and across global financial markets.  Although adopted 
in the wake of the crisis, these proposals are an extension of the Commission’s earlier pol-
icy under the Financial Services Action Plan and the Lamfalussy framework of promoting EU 
financial integration through convergence of supervisory practices and harmonised imple-
mentation of EU financial legislation.  The FSAP and Lamfalussy process, however, were not 
able to overcome different sets of standards, responsibilities and powers of member state 
supervisors that hampered the integration process and resulted in disjointed supervisory 
practices and a failure to identify and monitor risks building up in the financial system (IMF 
2007).  The proposed ESFS and ESRB recognise the importance of linking the supervisory 
practices of member state authorities in a more durable manner so that they can oversee 
more effectively the growing number of cross-border financial activities and the changing 
nature of systemic risk in the European financial system.   Moreover, the ESFS and the 
three European Supervisory Authorities will ensure that member state regulatory and su-
pervisory authorities can work more effectively together to control and manage systemic 
risk and develop a harmonised regulatory code and implementation across all EU states. 
 
2.2 A reformed European resolution regime  
Europe now has over fifty financial groups consisting of multiple subsidiaries and branches 
established in different EU states.  During the financial crisis, several of these financial 
groups collapsed and were taken into receivership, administration, or were bailed out by 
the group’s home authority.15 When the financial crisis began in August 2007, the impend-
ing failure of these financial institutions led to a chaotic scramble by member state supervi-
sory authorities to freeze and seize assets over which they had jurisdiction so that they 
could be marshalled for later distribution to creditors and depositors if recapitalisation or 
state bailout was not practicable.  As it turned out, most EU states did not have special 
bank resolution regimes and could only restructure failing banks by taking them into insol-
vency under domestic law or state ownership.   This situation dramatically highlighted the 
need for an effective EU legal framework to govern the resolution of failing and failed 
banks, especially for those banks that operate on a cross-border basis in Europe and are 
managed in group structures.   
 
At present, EU law simply applies the law of the state where the financial institution is in-
corporated or has its headquarters to the resolution and insolvency of the bank’s cross-
border operations.  EU states, however, have different domestic insolvency laws and proce-
dures for organising a regulator’s or administrator’s intervention into the affairs of a seri-
ously weak or failing bank.  In the recent crisis, these different national approaches in re-
solving and restructuring the cross-border operations of financial institutions led to the seg-
regation of assets of failed institutions in some EU states which were then not available to 
pay legitimate claims of depositors and other creditors in other EU states. The uncoordi-
nated and disjointed efforts by EU national authorities highlighted the need for a more ef-
fective cross-border EU legal framework to govern the resolution of failing and failed banks. 
 
                                                 
14Kern Alexander (2010) ‘Which supervisory model for Europe’ Note to the Committee on the Financial Crisis.   
15 The most dramatic of the group collapses were those of Royal Bank of Scotland, Fortis and Dexia.  
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The European Commission (2009) has published a Communication entitled ‘An EU Frame-
work for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector’ which analyses many of 
these issues and suggests reforms in certain areas which may require more substantive 
harmonisation of bank resolution requirements.  Although these are important proposals, it 
should be borne in mind that the adoption of a more harmonised EU bank resolution regime 
will not accomplish the objective of limiting systemic risk unless it is accompanied by 
stronger powers for national supervisory authorities to exercise prompt corrective action 
against weak and failing banks and non-bank financial institutions.  Lehman Brothers was 
an example of a complex, interconnected financial institution that however did not carry on 
the traditional banking business of taking deposits, but nevertheless was a systemic actor 
whose failure in September 2008 nearly caused a meltdown of the global financial system.  
An effective EU resolution regime must provide strong powers to national authorities to 
intervene in the decision-making of management if the supervisor determines that the bank 
or its management have failed to adhere to prudential standards.  Judicial review of super-
visory action in the area of prompt, corrective action and prudential regulation should be 
narrow and provide supervisors wide discretion to intervene in weak and failing banks and 
to restructure them if necessary.  For instance, the supervisor should have the authority to 
require the bank to recapitalise itself, if necessary over shareholder and management ob-
jections.  EU company law, however, provides strong rights in the Second Company Law 
Directive for shareholders of limited liability companies to approve any change in the finan-
cial structure of a company.  An effective EU resolution regime should require that the Sec-
ond Company Law Directive be amended to provide stronger powers for supervisors to re-
quire weak and failing banks to change their capital structure to satisfy prudential regula-
tory requirements. 
 
Any proposed EU reforms on bank resolution should perhaps consider closely some of the 
reforms that have been adopted recently by member states.  The UK Banking Act 2009 
provides a special resolution regime for deposit banks that empowers the Bank of England 
to intervene in shareholder rights and the rights of creditors of banks experiencing serious 
difficulties or which are failing and might possibly be taken into administration or liquida-
tion.  The Act provides the Bank of England with stabilization powers to transfer property 
and shares from a failing bank to a state-owned bridge bank or private bank.  Although the 
exercise of these resolution powers can substantially interfere with shareholder rights and 
other property rights, these powers have the objective of striking a balance between the 
legitimate rights of bank shareholders, creditors and depositors while preventing a failing 
bank from causing a systemic crisis and threatening depositor rights.  The UK special reso-
lution regime provides a model for how other states can manage the uncertainties of the 
present financial climate by balancing the rights and interests of bank owners and creditors 
with those of broader stakeholders and society who can potentially suffer severe economic 
damages as a result of a mismanaged bank that results in failure and substantial losses to 
the broader economy.  Nevertheless, to implement an effective resolution regime that pro-
vides EU states with prompt corrective powers may require amendments to existing EU 
Company Law (Second Company Law Directive) in order for authorities to take the neces-
sary measures that require shareholders to recapitalise the bank and to move away from 
socially risky business models. 
 
2.3 G20 and the Volcker rule 
An important component of the international policy response to the global financial crisis 
has been the strengthening of the macro-prudential orientation of financial supervision.  
Macro-prudential regulation involves a greater focus on the financial system as a whole and 
its linkages to the macro-economy (FSA 2009, De Laroisere, 2009, and FSF 2009).  The 
origins of the term ‘macroprudential’  have taken on great significance in the wake of the 
financial crisis and have been elaborated in the development of EU financial policy.   
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An important aspect of macro-prudential oversight involves monitoring and assessing sys-
temic risks –that is, the risks created by individual banks and the risks across the financial 
system.16  International regulatory reform efforts are being spearheaded by the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) – the G20 body consisting of supervisors from the leading twenty 
seven developed and developing countries – which is overseeing a number of initiatives 
ranging from capital and liquidity requirements, migrating over-the-counter derivatives 
onto clearing  houses, organising colleges of supervisors to oversee international banks, the 
adoption of ‘living wills’ for systemically-important banks and common principles for resolu-
tion regimes. 
 
In early 2010, the FSB endorsed President Obama’s proposal to prohibit deposit taking 
banks from proprietary trading in capital markets (ie., trading for their own account) and 
from investing in hedge funds and private equity.  The Obama proposal – the so-called 
Volcker rule – does not seek a complete separation between commercial and investment 
banking.  Rather, investment banks would still be permitted to engage in securities 
brokerage, asset management and corporate finance so long as these activities are 
undertaken on behalf of their client customers and not for the bank’s own account.  Banks 
that rely on deposit insurance for retail deposits would simply be prohibited from using 
those funds in the bank’s own investment activity and specifically could not invest in hedge 
funds and private equity.  An effect of the proposal would be to limit further growth of 
banks’ non-retail deposit liabilities because they would not be able to invest the money (as 
many did prior to the crisis) in speculative structured investment funds.  The Volker Rule is 
an example of quantitative regulation as distinct from price regulation. In a broader sense, 
the traditional regulatory approach seeks to make markets work better (by internalising 
externalities), whereas the quantitative or legal approach seeks to change the structure of 
markets. 
 
The proposal has been strongly criticised on several grounds.  For example, the proposal 
does not provide any meaningful details about how regulators would distinguish between a 
bank’s investment services on behalf of its clients and its proprietary trading activities for 
its own account.  It has also been criticised for focussing on deposit taking banks, and fail-
ing to address the systemic risks that arise from non-deposit taking financial institutions 
like Lehman brothers and Bear Stearns, whose interconnected exposures in the wholesale 
funding market and miscalculated risks on credit default swaps nearly toppled the global 
financial system in 2008.   
 
It should be emphasised that this proposal is intended to supplement other regulatory re-
forms the US has adopted such as a 10% cap on national market share for retail deposits 
and should not be considered a panacea.  Once the details are worked out, there is no rea-
son why the proposal should not prove to be effective and workable.  Its effectiveness, 
however, will depend on how well regulators adopt a more holistic approach to controlling 
the systemic risk that arises in wholesale capital markets and the particular risks posed by 
complex financial instruments and interconnected institutions and trading systems.  EU 
policymakers should consider the Obama proposal to be a quantitative supplement to a 
broader regulatory framework that should have what Mervyn King has described as a 
three-legged stool: 1) more stringent capital and liquidity requirements, 2) resolution re-
gime with living wills that allows unviable banks to fail, and 3) a restructured banking sys-
tem whose fault lines rely less on wholesale funding liabilities, and that involves banks con-
ducting more of their cross-border business through subsidiaries as opposed to branches so 
that regulatory capital can more easily be segregated in the jurisdictions where banks are 
taking the most risks. 
 
                                                 
16 However, “macro prudential” and “systemic risk” are not well-established terms in EU financial market legisla-
tion and regulation. Systemic risk however is referred to in EU financial legislation. See Directive 98/26/EC Set-
tlement Finality Directive; and proposed Alternative Investment Fund Management Directive, art 25. However, it is 
not comprehensively defined.  
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2.4 Sovereign debt crises – A European reform 
The problems arising from the Greek sovereign debt crisis raise important issues regarding 
how the EU and the eurozone institutions should assist member states which are experienc-
ing liquidity and/or insolvency problems.  The EU Growth and Stability Pact presently re-
quires member states not to run annual budget deficits in excess of 3% of gross domestic 
product (GDP) and not to have national debt in excess of 60% of GDP. The lack of en-
forcement of these rules and their uniform application across all member states regardless 
of where they are in the business cycle has undermined the Pact’s effectiveness.  Indeed, 
the Pact has resulted in neither growth nor stability.  Essentially, the EU lacks a fiscal policy 
dimension to assist states experiencing financial difficulties in crisis situations.  Indeed, 
Article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty prohibits EU institutions from bailing out EU states experi-
encing fiscal problems. 
The shape of necessary reforms has been defined by the Greek episode. The 
mismanagement of the Greek economy, exacerbated by the collapse of world trade and 
hence the collapse of shipping revenues, led to cumulative severe pressures on the bond 
sales necessary to fund the Greek government deficit. Since Greek government bonds are 
denominated in euros, investors faced no currency risk. However, they did face increasing 
fears of default.  The reaction in European capitals was to initiate a protracted, indecisive 
debate on raising the funds for a Greek "bail-out". As vague pronouncements were piled on 
indecision, the fear of default increased, so that when the €120 billion bail-out was at last 
agreed, it proved inadequate as a defence against the rising tide of default pessimism. 
The confused handling of the Greek crisis stands in stark contrast to the rapid and effective 
measures taken by the United States Government in the Mexican crisis of December 1994, 
which was very similar.  In the latter case, investors in Mexican government tesobonos 
faced a complex mixture of currency risk and default risk.  Yet the US$50 billion package 
assembled by the Clinton Administration in a few days, predominantly in the form of guar-
antees, stemmed the run and rapidly restored confidence.17 
If a credible eurozone institution had guaranteed Greek bonds at the outset, the immediate 
crisis would be over, at negligible cost.  Finally, EU finance ministers held an emergency 
meeting on 9 May 2010 where they agreed to adopt an extraordinary rescue package 
guaranteeing all of Greece’s sovereign bonds and the bonds of other eurozone members by 
establishing an off balance sheet entity which would issue bonds worth up to 660 billion 
euros (including an IMF 250 billion facility) to banks and other investors which would be 
fully guaranteed by eurozone states.  The emergency rescue package essentially bailed out 
the banks and other creditors who had purchased Greek sovereign debt and it imposed the 
burden of adjustment almost entirely on the taxpayers of Greece and indirectly on the 
taxpayers of all eurozone states.  The Greek rescue package will have the effect of 
increasing moral hazard for the creditors of EU sovereign states by incentivising them to 
make more and riskier loans to eurozone states with the cost of any adjustment borne by 
the debtor state and indirectly by European taxpayers.   
The confusion and delay in putting together the guarantee fed the flames of volatility and it 
is now not clear that even this sum will be enough.  A more damaging sequence of events 
would be difficult to imagine, but worse may come. Having at last chosen to follow a sensi-
ble guarantee strategy, the eurozone Governments plan to resuscitate the growth and sta-
bility pact. The eurozone has been gripped by deficit hysteria, with all Governments being 
forced to commit to massive cuts in public expenditure. The path to recovery is to be paved 
with unemployment and bankruptcy.18 
 
17 As Alan Greenspan recounts in his autobiography: "Mexico ended up using only a fraction of the credit. The 
minute confidence was restored, it paid the money back-the United States actually profited $500 million on the 
deal".  Greenspan (2009) 
18 As the Financial Times leader argued on 25th May 2010: 
"growth is a precondition for stability, not something to be traded off against it. Putting countries on the 
rack of debt deflation will not stabilise their economies, only destabilise their politics". 
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The Greek crisis demonstrates the inadequate crisis management framework in the EU and 
the need to establish a clear structure of macro-crisis management. As well as clear cut 
lines of responsibility and decision making, this might include a sovereign liquidity or ‘soli-
darity’ fund to which EU states experiencing short-term funding problems would have ac-
cess to borrow during times of crisis until they regain access to capital markets.  The EU 
‘solidarity’ fund would be paid for by a small transaction tax on all sovereign bond sales. 
The tax could be imposed at a very low level – ten basis points/0.10%, or five basis points/ 
0.05% - so as not to distort significantly the sovereign bond market and it would be easily 
enforced by the states issuing the bonds who would simply withdraw the tax at source from 
its coupon payments to investors over a period of time. 
 
If instead the country is not merely illiquid, but insolvent, more drastic measures should be 
taken and the EU sovereign liquidity fund would continue to be available, but needs to be 
supplemented by a mechanism for determining collective guarantees.  These should be 
offered on the basis of strict conditionality, in which the state in question may be required 
to undertake significant structural reforms to, for example, the fiscal system, the structure 
of macro-economic management, or the labour market.  Short-term austerity measures 
may be a necessary component of a rescue package. But their impact should always be 
assessed against the needs of medium term recovery.   
 
The approach we are suggesting would involve a major re-think of the political economy of 
the EU in general and the eurozone in particular.  It would require a significant change of 
direction in fiscal policy, with discretionary policy making replacing the rules of the Growth 
and Stability Pact that have so conspicuously failed.  Whether the institutions for 
discretionary policy can be constructed on a European scale is a political issue that is 
beyond the scope of this Study.  All that we would say is that to avoid the EU becoming an 
engine of cumulative deflation that will ultimately undermine the credibility of its 
institutions, a number of crucial issues in economic decision making must be resolved. 
 
As far as financial regulation is concerned, the breadth of activities permitted in financial 
markets define the parameters within which discretionary policies can operate. Re-thinking 
macro-prudential regulation is therefore an integral part of the wider reform of economic 
policy-making. 
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3.  GLOBAL SOLIDARITY MECHANISMS AND FINANCIAL 
TAXES  
The global financial crisis has imposed huge economic and social costs across developed 
and developing countries, with the burden falling disproportionately on the poorest.  The 
crisis has made it extremely difficult for developed countries to honour their pledges taken 
at the Gleneagles G7 Summit in 2005 to increase their financial support for global public 
goods and in particular to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  This chapter 
examines the effectiveness and feasibility of several financial taxes that aim to provide a 
sustainable source of revenue for governments to absorb some of the costs of crises and to 
pay for the MDGs and other public goods.  In doing so, we evaluate the effectiveness and 
feasibility of these taxes to accomplish the following separable objectives: 1) to curb exces-
sive risk-taking in the foreign exchange and wholesale securities, derivatives and futures 
markets, 2) provide adequate revenue to pay for the social costs of financial crises, and 3) 
and to pay for global public goods.19  We argue that the effectiveness and feasibility of 
these taxes will be determined in part by how well their design satisfies the following crite-
ria:  
1) existing clearing and settlement infrastructure is transparent and supports application,  
2) the tax level should achieve a balance of economic benefits in terms of risk mitigation 
that does not significantly distort the market nor undermine liquidity; 
3) raises adequate revenue to help pay for European and global goods; and    
4) complies with applicable EU and international legal requirements.  
We argue that centralised clearing and settlement systems make it practicable for authori-
ties to monitor and collect a tax on financial transactions, especially for foreign exchange 
transactions and centrally cleared derivatives.  A financial transaction tax is a generic term 
covering a number of possible taxes that could apply to certain securities investments, de-
rivative contracts or other financial products including commodities.  We will examine the 
currency transaction tax (CTT) and a broader tax on all exchange traded, centrally-cleared 
and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, and a bank balance sheet tax.  We conclude that a 
CTT satisfies these criteria because most foreign exchange transactions are settled by the 
Continuous Link Settlement Bank (CLS Bank) and the CTT could be imposed on a transna-
tional basis in the CLS Bank infrastructure with support from central bank real-time gross 
settlement systems (RTGS). 
 
By contrast, the non-forex OTC derivatives market lacks transparency and the institutional 
attributes that are necessary for effective monitoring and collection of a FTT.  Regulatory 
pressures, however, are leading to more and more OTC derivatives migrating to clearing 
houses in order to reduce systemic risk and counter party risk.  Central clearing of these 
trades will not only reduce risks and enhance synergies for dealers of these instruments, 
but also make it feasible to monitor transactions and potentially collect a transaction tax.  
Nevertheless, there are concerns regarding implementation, circumvention, evasion and 
enforcement which lead us to conclude that a tax on OTC trading would be very difficult to 
implement and if policymakers want to adopt it they should phase it in over a period of 
time until centralised clearing becomes a more accepted practice and then focus the tax 
mainly on derivatives trades that are centrally cleared.  Finally, we recognise that some 
countries may want unilaterally to impose a tax on bank balance sheets (ie., on non-
deposit liabilities or on profits), but we do not believe that this will be an appropriate tax for 
most emerging market countries. 
 
19 Global public goods can be defined as goods or services that are not provided by the market because of market 
failure and which government can therefore be justified in providing on efficiency grounds in order to enhance 
economic and social outcomes. 
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3.1 The economic rationale of financial transaction taxes 
The recent crisis has raised questions about the possibility of a Tobin or transactions tax to 
restrain the explosive growth of financial transactions in recent years.  Several international 
organisations, the G20 and some developed countries are debating and examining the vi-
ability of a financial transactions tax (FTT) that would be aimed at limiting excessive risk-
taking in financial markets, providing an insurance fund for the failure of large financial 
institutions, and providing revenue to assist countries in coping with the crisis and in pro-
viding public goods.   
 
It is important to note that these three objectives are separable, both in their economic 
rationale and in practice. The first objective, limiting excessive risk-taking is derived from 
the desire to price risk efficiently. In this case how the funds are used subsequently is not 
part of the agenda. The proposition that such funds might be used to build an insurance 
fund is quite separate argument related not to mitigating the riskiness of financial transac-
tions but to pricing accurately the implicit insurance provided to institutions too big to fail. 
The provision of assistance to those most affected by ill chosen risk-taking is a third com-
ponent of an efficient pricing strategy.  Hence the objective of efficient pricing may be pur-
sued by adopting all three goals at once, or by pursuing them separately. 
 
The idea behind a FTT has been attributed to Nobel Laureate James Tobin who proposed a 
currency transaction tax in the 1970s primarily to limit the destabilising influence of the 
growing volume of very short-term forex transactions and enhance control over financial 
aspects of macro-economic policy.20  Since Tobin’s original proposal, the idea of a financial 
transaction tax has been developed by economists and civil society groups as a possible 
revenue source to finance global development objectives (Haq et al., 1996).  Recently, the 
global financial crisis has brought the issue back on the agenda with the G20’s efforts to 
rebuild the financial architecture.  Unlike the pre-crisis literature, proposals for a FTT have 
gained considerable traction, both as a financial stability instrument and/or as a solution to 
pay for global public goods, such as the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the 
2009 Copenhagen Agreement climate change policies. 
 
In considering the merits of a financial transaction tax, one should bear in mind that the 
object of economic activity is to produce goods and services.  Financial transactions are the 
means by which that production is funded. But in recent years transactions have grown 
much more rapidly than production and trade. This raises two important questions.  First, 
why have they grown so rapidly? Second, what should be the ideal volume of transactions 
relative to the trade and production they support? 
 
In the 1960s, world trade grew by 8.2 per cent a year. That trade, together with long-term 
investment flows, was financed by foreign exchange transactions that were roughly double 
the value of the trade deals themselves. Between 2000 and 2007 growth in trade had 
slowed to just 5.8 per cent a year. Yet the value of foreign exchange transactions had risen 
to more than 80 times the value of the underlying trade and long-term investment.  Or 
consider another example of transactions growth, particularly relevant to the current finan-
cial distress. At the centre of much of the turbulence has been the use of credit default 
swaps (CDSs). It is estimated that, at the end of June 2008, the value of CDSs outstanding 
in major financial markets was US$57.3 trillion (BIS, 2009). In late 2008, the US Deposi-
tory Trust and Clearing Corporation revealed that the value of CDS transactions was ten 
times greater than the value of the underlying risk being insured. 
 
The growth of derivatives markets and in particular of CDSs and other similar instruments 
can be attributed to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s.  As fluc-
tuations in exchange rates became commonplace, opportunities for profit proliferated, and 
rules restricting flows of capital were removed.  
                                                 
20 Tobin (1978, 154). 
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And this, in turn, reinforced the need for investors to hedge against fluctuating rates:  un-
der the new system foreign exchange risk was no longer borne by the public sector, but by 
the private sector. 
 
This privatisation of risk created an expansion in the scale and variety of derivative instru-
ments designed to hedge risks. The total value of such contracts rose from just over 
US$1,000 billion in 1986, to around US$516,000 billion in 2007. And less than a third of 
these were standardised traded instruments, bought and sold on exchanges. The rest were 
customised transactions between two parties, provided “over the counter” (OTC). 
 
After Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008, liquidity vanished because it was impossible to 
sell OTC assets, or to use them as collateral. It became clear that neither the senior execu-
tives of sophisticated banks, nor their regulators, understood the deals made in their 
names.  But the risk to the economy as a whole was not just a function of  complexity, but 
also of the sheer size of the transactions themselves,  relative to the underlying trade or 
loans on which they were written. For example, Lehman’s OTC credit default swap book 
had a notional value of US$72 billion, yet Lehman’s net exposure to OTC credit default con-
tracts is estimated to have been only about US$5.2 billion. When the credit rating of AIG 
was downgraded, it had to post new collateral of US$13 billion on its gross liabilities – 
something it was unable to do. 
 
The problem of the seemingly ever-growing tower of transactions erected on foundations of 
relatively small underlying assets has led to the now generally accepted policy conclusion 
discussed above in 1.4: As many assets as possible should be forced into clearing systems, 
or markets where they can be readily bought and sold. If financial instruments are traded, 
this reveals what they are actually worth.  And it has the further advantage of encouraging 
the development of simpler “plain vanilla” assets, rather than complicated derivates.  These 
simpler assets can be “netted” to reveal the true underlying risk.  The British and US au-
thorities, as well as international bodies such as the G20, the Financial Stability Board and 
the EU are now all proposing some form of central clearing for CDSs. Some, including the 
US Treasury and the EU, are calling for all standardised contracts to be traded through a 
clearing house or an exchange. 
 
This would be a major improvement, but there will still be the issue of the growing volume 
of non-standard, over-the-counter contracts, and the apparently inexorable growth of the 
ratio of gross to net transactions. That is where the suggestion of Adair Turner, Chairman 
of the UK Financial Services Authority, that policymakers should give serious consideration 
to a transactions tax (Turner, 2010).  The growth of transactions imposes a risk on society 
as a whole. Those who impose that risk should pay for it. If they don’t, then risk is mis-
priced. 
 
Academic opinion, however, is strongly divided over what utility financial transaction taxes 
have in curbing excessive risk-taking and generating sustainable sources of revenue.  Pro-
ponents of financial transaction taxes have based their views on certain assumptions about 
trading and pricing in asset markets: that modern financial markets are characterised by 
excessive trading activity and short-term speculation, and that such speculation generates 
volatility not only in short-term asset prices, but also in long-term asset prices marked by 
persistent and dramatic departures from equilibrium.21  Keynes observed that this led to 
the ‘predominance of speculation over enterprise’ and led to reduced long-term investment 
and growth.  Accordingly, a tax on transactions in securities and other financial instruments 
would increase the cost of speculative trading, especially for trades with shorter durations, 
and this would have a stabilising effect on asset prices. Moreover, the tax would generate 
revenue needed to assist governments with fiscal consolidation, especially during times of 
crisis.            
 
 
21 Summers and Summers (1989), Stiglitz (1989), De Long et al. (1990),and Schulmeister (2009). 
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Opponents of transaction taxes generally share the view that the case is flawed because it 
ignores the fact that a high number of transactions – both short and long-term - are neces-
sary for the price discovery process to work and for the efficient distribution of risk.  More 
transactions lead to a smoothing in asset price movements towards equilibrium,22 and 
short-term trading is necessary to allow effective hedging and should not therefore be lim-
ited. Any increase in transaction costs (ie., a tax) would limit parties ability to hedge risk, 
thus reducing liquidity and increasing short-term volatility of asset prices. An alternative, 
and fundamentally contradictory point, is that globalised and liberalised financial markets 
make it very difficult to implement a FTT and will result in evasion and circumvention of the 
FTT, thereby reducing substantially its effectiveness and its revenue-raising capacity.     
  
3.1.1 Global public goods 
Many reports have extolled the virtues of financial transaction taxes as a source of innova-
tive financing to pay for economic and social development.23 The severe economic and so-
cial costs of the global financial crisis have reinforced the need for policymakers to consider 
alternative and innovative sources of finance to fund commitments made by developed 
states to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by promising substantial 
increases in public resources to reduce poverty in the world’s poorest countries.24 The G7 
Heads of State reaffirmed the MDGs in 2005 at the Gleneagles G7 Summit by promising 
increased financial support for poverty reduction in the world’s poorest countries and by 
raising Official Development Assistance to 0.7% of Gross National Product, along with cli-
mate change mitigation measures for developing countries. These financial commitments, 
however, have not been kept.  Indeed, the World Bank has estimated that since 2005 the 
resource gap between the financial commitments made by developed countries and their 
actual expenditures and support levels for global public goods grew significantly and would 
reach an estimated range of between US$324-336 billion per year sometime between 2012 
and 2017 (OECD 2009).  This resource gap for global public goods could be reduced, how-
ever, if the global economy revives and achieves a self-sustaining recovery with increased 
growth rates and tax receipts.  Nevertheless, even if the global economy improves, the 
resource gap for developed countries will remain substantial, thus making it difficult for 
developed countries to fulfil their financial commitments for global public goods.  Therefore, 
policymakers must consider alternative forms of finance to provide sustainable and sub-
stantial sources of finance to achieve MDGs and climate change mitigation objectives. 
 
The International Monetary Fund is now considering these taxes and is expected to propose 
in a report in June 2010 that countries considering FTTs would do best to adopt a financial 
stability tax on bank balance sheets that would pay for a bank resolution fund and/or a fi-
nancial activity tax that would be levied on the profits and remuneration of financial institu-
tions and paid to a general revenue fund.25  Similarly, the European Commission (2010) is 
considering the various options for a global financial transaction tax and how it might be 
implemented in the European Union.   
                                                 
22 Habermeier and Kirilenko (2003), and Grahl and Lysandrou (2003). 
23 See Task Force for Financial Integrity and Economic Development (2009) ‘Taxing Banks’. 
24 UN General Assembly resolution, United Nations Millennium Declaration, (18 Sept. 2000) A/Res/55/2.  The 
United Nations MDGs were adopted by the UN General Assembly at the Millennium Summit in 2000 joining the 
world together in a fifteen year effort to combat hunger, disease, and poverty.  The MDGs are the most compre-
hensive definition of what global public goods are and have served as a basis for measuring the success of coun-
tries’ efforts in achieving internationally agreed development goals.  The MDGs consist of eight specific goals that 
include: 1) eradicating extreme poverty; (2) achieving universal primary education; (3) promoting gender equality 
and empowering women; (4) reducing child mortality; (5) improving maternal health; (6) combating HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other diseases; (7) ensuring environmental sustainability; and (8) developing a global partnership for 
development.  
25 International Monetary Fund ‘A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector – Interim Report for the 
G20’, pp 2-3 (23 April 2010). The IMF report proposes two types of financial contributions or taxes: 1) a ‘financial 
stability contribution’ that is linked to an effective bank resolution mechanism, and 2) a ‘Financial Activities Tax’ 
(FAT) that is imposed on the amount of profits and remuneration of financial institutions and would be paid to 
general revenue.   
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The European Parliament has supported this initiative and has urged the European Union to 
agree on a common position in the international framework of G-20 meetings as regards 
the options as to how the financial sector could make a fair and substantial contribution 
toward paying for the social costs inflicted on the global economy because of excessive 
risk-taking and to compensate governments for the costs associated with bank bailouts and 
other forms of government intervention to stabilise the financial sector during the crisis.26  
Other states have followed the EU Parliament’s lead by examining the feasibility of innova-
tive sources of finance (including FTTs) to pay for global development objectives, but ex-
pressly not considering the taxes for regulatory objectives.27 
 
3.2 Currency Transaction Tax (CTT)  
The foreign exchange market (‘FX market’) is crucial for the functioning of the global finan-
cial system because it is the largest and most liquid of the asset class markets.  In the 
post-crisis environment, it has taken on an even greater significance because of the recog-
nised importance of liquidity to the successful operation of the global financial system.  The 
FX market is used by most banks’ customers – including corporations, institutional inves-
tors (life insurance and pension funds), and sovereign wealth and hedge funds.  Although 
trading volumes dropped in 2008-2009 in the aftermath of the Lehman's collapse, daily 
volumes have now increased from their lows and are expected to grow further as the mar-
ket recovers.  In 2009, the average daily turnover of the FX market was in excess of three 
trillion US dollars.  The vast majority of the market (about 90%) consists of spot transac-
tions, outright forwards and swaps, while non-traditional foreign exchange derivatives and 
products (currency swaps and options, and exchange traded contracts) make up only ten 
percent of the market (Chart 8).  Most of these trades are either ‘spot’ (traded immedi-
ately) or due to be settled within 7 days, which suggests that most of these trades are 
mainly speculation and have little connection to underlying trade   Moreover, banks are the 
main dealers and intermediaries in the FX market because of their institutional capacities to 
handle high volume trading and the associated risks.  The largest foreign exchange dealers 
are ten banks that control nearly 80% of the market in foreign exchange dealing.28 
 
 
26 European Parliament, Motion for a resolution to wind-up the debate by the Commission pursuant to Rule 110 (2) 
of the Rules of Procedure on Financial transaction taxes – making them work’ (8.1.2010) B7 0000/2009. In this 
context, the Parliament has resolved that the EU should adopt its own strategy regarding the range of possible 
options for prudential regulatory measures, including a global financial transaction tax that will have the twin ob-
jectives of addressing serious market failures in the banking and capital markets whilst serving as a source of 
innovative finance to pay for the social costs imposed on countries by the crisis and providing for global public 
goods, including the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and climate change policies. 
27 Financial Leaders Group (a group of countries) has followed the initiative of the EU Parliament and other gov-
ernments with support for a global currency transaction tax. See FLG Terms of Reference (on file with authors). 
28 The banks ranked in order of their market share: Deutsche Bank, UBS AG, Barclays Capital, Royal Bank of Scot-
land, Citigroup, JP Morgan, HSBC, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, BNP Paribas. See Annex III. The concentrated 
market share held by these banks suggests possible competition law concerns in the  provision of forex dealer 
services.  
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 Chart 8 
 
 
  
A CTT would work as follows: it would be assessed on individual foreign exchange transac-
tions by dealers in the foreign exchange market and monitored and possibly collected by 
the Continuous Link Settlement Bank (CLS Bank) with support from central banks through 
their real-time gross settlement systems (Annex V).  This could work with national authori-
ties conducting the collection on a national basis in cooperation with central banks and with 
access to information provided by payment and settlement institutions such as the CLS 
Bank.  The financial intermediaries and dealers would pay the tax and if there were no in-
termediary in the process (eg., intra-group payments within a corporate group) then the 
taxpayer would be come liable itself (ie., the corporate holding company).  Generally, how-
ever, the country would collect the CTT on all transactions through the intermediaries 
(banks and other brokers) based within that country, independently of where the transac-
tions are negotiated, the location of transferor or transferee, or the place of settlement.         
 
The CTT is similar to the Tobin Tax, but is different in important respects: the Tobin tax 
was intended to slow the flow of cross-border capital (‘throw sand in the wheels’) to en-
hance the ability of national authorities to conduct monetary policy and to prevent an ex-
change rate crisis.  This meant that the Tobin Tax had to be at a high enough rate (0.50% 
or 1.0%) to change investor behaviour, which led to the criticism that under certain cir-
cumstances it would significantly limit liquidity in the market, which could exacerbate a 
crisis.  Instead, a CTT could be assessed at a low enough rate (0.01%/1 basis point or 
0.005%/ one-half a basis point) so as not unduly to limit liquidity, while deterring only 
those transactions with such low spreads (0.01% or 0.005% or less) that it would not have 
an appreciable effect on liquidity nor on underlying economic activity.     
 
The advocates of a CTT are motivated by two related concerns. First, it seems appropriate 
that global public goods are financed out of the profitability of activity driven by globalisa-
tion. Second, the exponential growth of foreign exchange turnover has far exceeded the 
growth of world trade and cross-border investment flows and therefore the tax should be 
used to reduce the disproportionately large growth of foreign exchange transactions.  
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The potential revenue to be generated by such a tax, especially if the leading reserve cur-
rency countries29 adopt it on a cross-border basis, would be substantial and could be used 
to pay for economic development objectives in poor countries and for other public goods, 
such as climate change initiatives.  The average daily value of foreign exchange transac-
tions is close to US$3 trillion (Chart 8).  Accordingly, such a tax could raise billions of dol-
lars per year to pay for global public goods or other social causes.  To raise such sums, the 
rate of the tax could be very low indeed – at 0.005% of the value of the transactions - and 
still raise substantial sums.  Nevertheless, for such a tax to be effective in raising large 
amounts, it would have to be universal in scope, comprehensive in application, and not 
easily evaded. 
 
3.2.1 How high should the CTT rate be and how much revenue? 
The rate at which the tax should be levied involves an analysis of how much revenue can 
be generated at a particular rate without substantially limiting liquidity.  This will depend on 
two factors: 1) how much the market will decline given the tax rate charged, and 2) the 
market’s capacity to pay the tax.  Schmidt (2008) estimates a fall in volume of transactions 
of 14% if the rate of one half of a basis point (0.005%) is levied.  The market’s capacity to 
pay the tax will depend in part on the depth of liquidity in the market and ability of dealers 
and clients to circumvent and avoid the tax. Some studies suggest significant ‘market 
dampening’ and ‘leakage’ would lead to a market reduction of twenty five percent (Baker, 
2008).  In contrast to these cautious estimates, the actual experience of financial markets 
with stamp duties levied on equity share trading (UK) or on both equity and bond transac-
tions (Brazil) is that these markets have generally internalised these taxes without substan-
tial reductions in market trading or avoidance.  For instance, the 0.5% UK stamp duty on 
share transactions generated about £3.9 billion for the UK Treasury in 2009. This did not 
limit London’s role as a leading international financial centre, nor undermine the London 
Stock Exchange’s premier position as a leading international exchange.  Moreover, Brazil 
has successfully levied a tax on currency exchange agreements and a tax on transactions 
involving bonds and securities which has not led to substantial market dampening.30  Brazil 
has generated substantial revenues from its ‘umbrella-type’ array of transaction taxes on 
foreign investment in equity stock and debt instruments at a rate of 2%;31 and its most 
recent transaction tax on bonds and securities, including those trades carried out on the 
Brazilian stock exchange, is at 1.5%.32  Both the UK and Brazilian equity and bond markets 
continue to grow strongly despite the economic and financial slowdown. 
   
At a 0.005% levy, the proposed CTT is 100 times smaller than the UK’s existing stamp duty 
on shares and therefore should not undermine London’s position as the leading centre for 
foreign exchange trading!33  Proponents of the CTT estimate that a low tax rate can gener-
ate substantial revenue even if only applied to a few reserve currencies (UK sterling, and 
euro) (Nissanke 2003, 72; Patomaki & Sehm-Patomaki, 1999).  Accordingly, it is difficult to 
show that a UK CTT of 0.005% – equivalent to a £500 charge for a £10m transaction – 
would undermine London’s status as the world’s leading centre for foreign exchange trad-
ing. 
 
 
29 The five main currencies which constitute foreign exchange market trading are; the US dollar 86.3%; euro 
37.0%; Japanese Yen 17.0%; UK sterling 15.0%, Swiss franc 6.8%;. The ultimate totals for all currencies would 
equal 200% to reflect the two legs of a currency trade. 
30 See Barbosa, Mussnich and Aragao (14 Dec. 2009) ‘Changes in Brazilian IOF/Exchange and IOF/Bonds and 
Securities Taxes’.    
31 A tax of two percent was applied to foreign investments in stocks and fixed income securities. The tax was 
aimed primarily to curb capital inflows into Brazil’s capital markets which has recently driven up the value of the 
reais. See Barbosa pp. 3-4. 
32 Decree No. 7,011/09 (Brazilian Official Gazette, 19 Nov. 2009). Under Brazilian law, these taxes are defined as 
‘extrafiscal’ meaning that these taxes have economic and financial purposes, other than the purpose of raising 
revenue for the government.  Unlike other taxes, the authorities can alter these taxes flexibly without parliamen-
tary approval to respond to changing economic and financial circumstances (Barbosa et al., 2009). 
33 London serves as the world’s leading foreign exchange trading centre with over 35% of the value of foreign 
exchange transactions taking place in London, followed by the US (13.9%), Japan (6.7%), Singapore, 6.0%. See 
International Financial Services London (Sept. 2009).     
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The most comprehensive and realistic estimates of how much money a CTT can raise are 
from Schmidt (2008) and Baker (2008).  Based on 2007 data before the crisis, Schmidt 
(2008) provides the more optimistic estimate that a coordinated CTT levied at 0.005% 
(one-half a basis point) applied to the leading reserve currencies34 would yield US$33.41 
billion a year.35  In contrast, a coordinated CTT at the same rate on all the major currencies 
except the dollar would yield US$21.24 billion a year, and a coordinated tax on only the 
euro and sterling would  yield US$16.52 billion a year.  His estimates are more realistic and 
much lower than what other CTT proponents had estimated because he gives more weight 
to market dampening as a result of the tax.36  Most of the volume reductions that result 
from the tax derive from the loss of short-term trading, such as algorithmic trading, that 
responds to very small spreads of less than one basis point which would be smaller than 
the estimated tax.  On the other hand, his revenue estimates can be considered more op-
timistic because he minimises the risk of avoidance and circumvention because of the ex-
pected effect of centralised settlement in the CLS bank system which would make it very 
difficult to avoid paying the tax.   
 
Schmidt’s higher estimates should be contrasted with those of other CTT and FTT advocates 
who adopt similar methodologies but give more weight to avoidance and circumvention.  
For instance, Baker (2008) estimated a CTT yield of only US$7.8 billion that took into ac-
count a higher level of market reduction of 25% based on a tax rate of 0.01% (one basis 
point).  Nissanke (2003) uses 2001 BIS data to estimate that a global CTT at a rate of 
0.02% applied to wholesale transactions would yield between US$30-35 billion while at a 
rate of 0.01% would yield between US$17-US$31 billion a year.  We adopt Schmidt’s esti-
mate of US$33.41 billion a year because it offers a realistic assessment of the capacity of 
the CTT to raise revenue based on the depth and liquidity of the foreign exchange markets 
and the institutional consolidation that is occurring in centralised settlement of foreign ex-
change transactions in the Continuous Link Settlement System.       
 
3.2.2 CTT implementation – CLS Bank 
It is important to consider the potential role of the Continuous Link Settlement System 
(CLS System) in ensuring that the CTT is implemented effectively.  Most foreign exchange 
transactions are settled – payment for one currency is delivered for payment of another 
currency (PvP) – through the process of centralised settlement.  The CLS System provides 
an institutional framework for the settlement of currency transactions on a transnational 
and centralised basis for the leading reserve currencies that are used by its member banks 
and participating institutions in the CLS System.37  The CLS system holds data on all for-
eign exchange transactions which it settles and provides the existing administrative infra-
structure that could be used to facilitate and/or collect a currency transaction tax. 
 
The success so far of the CLS bank as a settlement service provider and its growing size in 
the FX settlement market suggests that the exercise of its settlement function could also be 
applied to collect a tax on currency transactions.  Participants in CLS, however, would likely 
be nervous that a tax levied through CLS, but not elsewhere, could create a disincentive to 
use CLS. It is likely that the private benefits of banks using CLS, benefits from reduced 
counter-party credit risk, systemic liquidity risk, exposure risk, etc, exceed the cost of a 
small CTT levy of 0.01% or 0.005%.  
                                                 
34 The leading reserve currencies are the US dollar, euro, Japanese yen, British pound, and Swiss franc. 
35 Schmidt’s (2008) estimates for a CTT on the US dollar as one leg alone against all other currencies amounted 
to: US$28.8 billion, while a CTT on the euro alone as one leg against all other currencies would yield US$12.29, 
and similarly on the yen alone against all other currencies US$ 5.59 billion, and sterling alone against all other 
currencies at US$ 4.98 billion. 
36 For example, this should be compared with the much higher estimate of $176 billion a year by Frankel (1996). 
37 These currencies are: the US dollar, euro, Japanese yen, UK pound, Swiss franc, Australian dollar, Canadian 
dollar, Swedish krona, Hong Kong dollar, Norwegian krona, New Zealand dollar, Mexican peso, Singapore dollar, 
South Korean won.   
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These private benefits are also social benefits and consequently either banks using CLS 
should be entitled to a reduction in capital adequacy requirements for their trading books, 
or alternatively those not using CLS or a similar system should face higher capital adequacy 
requirements for their trading book. 
 
The CLS Bank is a natural candidate for managing the implementation of the CTT because it 
holds data on all foreign exchange transactions which it settles and could provide data to 
national governments regarding the volume and value of foreign exchange transactions 
with a view to potentially collecting a tax from these transactions.  Of course, the CLS Bank 
does not have the legal mandate to collect taxes for any governmental or state entity and 
could only do so based on statutory or treaty authorisation.  However, if it did have such 
authorisation, how successful might it be in collecting revenue? 
 
3.2.3  CLS estimated volumes and value 
CLS Bank has shown consistent growth since 2002 in both the value and volume of foreign 
exchange transactions it settles (Annex IV).  The increasing value and volume of CLS 
transactions can be attributed in part to the growing value and volume of trades between 
CLS, its member banks and third party users. CLS now settles trades in 17 currencies, an 
increase from the original seven currencies in 2002.  Although the number of bank mem-
bers has not changed substantially since 2002, the number of third party users has in-
creased substantially - including non-CLS member banks, non-bank financial institutions, 
corporations, and investment funds - to over 1400 members in 2010 (CLS 2010).   This has 
resulted in substantial growth in the value and volume of foreign exchange transactions 
settled through the CLS system. 
 
In 2009, the CLS Bank settled approximately fifty five (55%) of the value of foreign ex-
change transactions  (Annex II).38  Traditional correspondent banking settles about 32% of 
the value of foreign exchange transactions (Annex I).39  The CLS System is clearly the 
dominant method for foreign exchange settlement because of the synergies and reduced 
exposure for counterparty banks to foreign exchange settlement and credit risk.40  These 
benefits make it profitable for banks to incur the relatively low costs of participating in the 
CLS System while achieving the regulatory objective of reducing settlement risk and sys-
temic risk.41 
 
However, using CLS to settle foreign exchange transactions is optional – even for its share-
holder banks – and therefore if banks perceive that they can save costs by settling certain 
transactions through other methods (ie., bi-lateral correspondent banking) they are free to 
do so, even though this may not be desirable from a regulatory perspective.  Moreover, the 
Basel II capital rules do not create incentives for banks to settle their foreign exchange 
trades through CLS: banks are required to hold the same level of capital on their forex ex-
posures whether they are settled through CLS, bilaterally, or otherwise.  Market partici-
pants are highly price sensitive and not obliged to settle through the CLS infrastructure.   
                                                 
38 Recent, unconfirmed data suggest that CLS now settles about 70% of the global forex market. Meeting with Rob 
Close, CEO of the CLS Bank (1 March, 2010). 
39 A lower portion of the FX settlement market is held with ‘on-us without settlement risk’ (3%) and ‘on-us with 
settlement risk’ (1%) where both legs of a foreign exchange trade are settled across the books of a single institu-
tion. See definitions and description of ‘on-us without settlement risk’ and ‘on-us with settlement risk’ in Annex II.  
40 Some suggest that CLS could expand its range of foreign exchange coverage by offering same-day settlement of 
trades, such as dollar-yen, which has been difficult to achieve because of the time difference between the US and 
Japan, and further expanding the currencies its covers and signing up more banks as members (BIS 2008). 
41 Although we assert that CLS Bank would provide an efficient institutional mechanism for collecting the tax, we 
however recognise that there are accountability concerns in having a private US bank perform such an important 
public function and therefore we would suggest that the 17 participating central banks in the CLS System agree 
with the private bank members of the CLS System to change the governance structure of the CLS System to allow 
participation of non-CLS member central banks and tax authorities so that they can be involved in monitoring data 
related to the tax and its collection.  
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Unless there are offsetting benefits therefore from using CLS there is concern that there is 
a significant possibility of capital flight from the CLS system, thereby potentially leading to 
adverse economic effects from the tax.42 
 
The CLS Bank’s growing share of the foreign exchange settlement market suggests that it 
will have institutional dominance in the future over the management and collection of data 
related to the value and volume of foreign exchange transactions.  Nevertheless, its grow-
ing market share is fragile and could drop if member banks and their customers decided to 
settle FX transactions through more traditional ways, such as bilateral correspondent bank-
ing, or other alternative settlement arrangements.43  However, member banks and their 
customer financial firms and institutions which settle through CLS gain substantial benefits 
and synergies in terms of risk reduction and would probably not want to sacrifice these sig-
nificant cost advantages for the sake of paying a very low tax rate on foreign exchange 
trading.  Based on the above, it is difficult to estimate reliably how much tax could be 
raised through the existing CLS system given the voluntary nature of CLS for its member 
banks.  However, assuming the current size of the FX market (US$3 trillion a day) and the 
substantial synergies and risk reduction benefits banks gain from settling through CLS 
bank, we can surmise that a low tax of 0.005% would probably not deter many transac-
tions from settling in the CLS system.  Therefore, based on the gross size of the FX market 
and the CLS market share of 55%, we can conclude based on Schmidt’s estimates in 3.2.1 
that if the tax were only collected on foreign exchange transactions settled through the CLS 
bank it would generate just over US$18 billion a year. 
 
3.2.4 Technical feasibility and incidence 
In considering the administration of a financial transaction tax, previous studies support the 
viability of such a tax being administered in modern foreign exchange settlement systems.  
Indeed, Schmidt (2008) has observed: 
 
“The infrastructure for settling foreign exchange trades is increasingly formal, centralized 
and regulated. This is due to new technology, subject to increasing returns to scale, and to 
cooperation between trading and central banks to reduce settlement risk. Settling a foreign 
exchange trade requires at least two payments, one of each of the currencies traded. Set-
tlement risk is eliminated when payment obligations are matched and traced to the original 
trade, and then payments are made simultaneously. The technology and institutions now in 
place to support this make it possible to identify and tax gross foreign exchange payments, 
whichever financial instrument is used to define the trade, wherever the parties to the 
trade are located, and wherever the ensuing payments are made.” 
 
The CLS Bank, along with the CLS infrastructure, could permit currency transaction taxes to 
be imposed at relatively low levels, which has little effect on the relative costs of the trans-
action.  Nevertheless, central banks that operate RTGS systems have emphasised that 
there was nothing in their mandate that would authorise them to support the CLS bank in 
collecting a CTT.  Understandably, central bankers charged with financial stability are very 
concerned about undermining market stability, and would be concerned about any process 
that drove participants off well established and well run existing markets which might hin-
der liquidity and significantly raise transaction costs.  This point is reinforced by the belief 
that the CLS bank had performed extremely well during the crisis and especially during the 
week in September 2008 when Lehman’s Brothers collapsed the CLS bank settled effec-
tively $26.3 trillion in foreign exchange payments for the 17 reserve currencies settled in 
the CLS system.   Central Banks would like more use of CLS because of the high transpar-
ency of the transactions.  
 
                                                 
42 CLS Bank costs £80mn a year to run CLS which is recouped by a charge on the transactions going through CLS 
– a charge of only 22p on a transaction/instruction of £1 million. This charge was described as “a struggle to get 
the market to bear”.  
43 See Annex II. 
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Nevertheless, in an age when authorities have effectively nationalised the bulk of banking 
systems, where governments and central banks have purchased substantial quantities of 
hard to value private instruments, if regulators believe using a central settlement system 
promotes financial stability then using such a system can be made mandatory for instru-
ments to be legally valid or there could be higher capital adequacy requirements for those 
taking greater systemic risk for not using a central settlement system with central bank 
participation. 
 
On the other hand, the incidence of the tax may create private costs that offset the social 
benefits from enhanced regulation.  Foreign exchange trade encompasses a huge amount 
of different commercial activities with differing motivations. While foreign exchange specu-
lation was one type of commercial activity taking place on the market, a large number of 
trade, investment, savings, and pensions activity – conducted by individuals and business 
entities at the retail and wholesale levels - involves the foreign exchange markets.  As 
such, a large proportion of ‘activity’ on the foreign exchange market is already taxed in 
numerous ways.  Also, foreign exchange trading supports international trade in goods and 
services and a tax on currency transactions might hinder international trade itself by in-
creasing the cost of trade finance, especially for developing countries.  It is uncertain 
whether it is desirable to try and exclude from the CTT transactions that primarily support 
international trade because it might be difficult to differentiate between foreign exchange 
speculation and hedging transactions and currency transactions that are incidental to inter-
national trade.  On the other hand, the size of the levy being proposed is unlikely to make 
any material difference to a corporate or real goods trade transaction.  It may be useful to 
note that on many of these transactions, legal and banking fees often amount to well in 
excess of 1.0% or 100 basis points.  In large cross-border corporate finance transactions, 
banks charge advisory fees, arrangement fees and commitment fees, and each of these is a 
large multiple of a basis point.  In trade finance transactions, banking fees are similar, 
amounting to many multiples of a basis point.    
 
Some critics, however, are sceptical that the tax would have a ‘negligible effect’.  Whilst the 
proposed size of the levy (0.005% or 0.5 basis points) appears very low, it is not low rela-
tive to the spreads for the most liquid exchange rates in the foreign exchange market such 
as euro/US$, £/US$, and US$/¥.  In times of low volatility, spreads for these currencies 
were reported to stand at around one basis point, in which case a 0.5 basis point levy 
would be very significant.  Nevertheless, it should be noted that the spread is not a reflec-
tion of trading profitability, but reflects the price of liquidity.  Banks make profit from trad-
ing foreign exchange partly by charging for this liquidity, but primarily by following trends 
in the market place and in their customer business. 
 
Regarding the burden of the tax, it should be observed that in terms of information the 
foreign exchange market is primarily a wholesale market.  Retail transactions are a very 
small proportion of total transactions.  The burden of the tax will fall on those carrying out 
thousands of transactions over short periods of time – this is decidedly not retail, it is 
wholesale and is primarily algorithmic trading.  For instance, a pension fund investor will 
execute transactions in a long-term fund a few times a year, whilst a hedge fund would do 
so hundreds of times. 
 
3.2.5 The CTT in summary 
To be effective, a currency transaction tax should be adopted on the broadest definition of 
foreign exchange transactions.  The tax should be paid on each foreign exchange transac-
tion regardless of how it is settled.  Although it would be desirable for the countries and 
jurisdictions which issue the 17 reserve currencies of the CLS Bank to sign an international 
treaty that would give the tax universal effect, such an international agreement would 
probably take a few years to negotiate and ratify.  Therefore, we recommend that countries 
should in the first instance decide unilaterally to impose the tax on all foreign exchange 
transactions in a particular currency wherever the transaction takes place in the world.   
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The tax can be imposed in an inexpensive and efficient way at the point of transaction set-
tlement through the Continuous Link Settlement Bank with support from CLS’s participating 
central banks which issue the main reserve currencies.  The fact that all foreign exchange 
transactions are electronic makes collection cheaper and evasion very difficult.  A levy on 
the euro will need a consensus from all euro area members. However, countries, such as 
the UK, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark could implement a CTT unilaterally for 
little expense in cost, time and effort, if they so wished. 
 
The tax could be collected nationally through a country’s RTGS payment settlement sys-
tems or trans-nationally by the CLS Bank and the proceeds could be shared between na-
tional governments and international organisations.  Once collected, the revenue could be 
distributed either to national authorities first who might then have an obligation to use a 
pre-agreed portion of the revenues for domestic crisis and poverty relief before sending 
another agreed portion of the proceeds to international organisations to be distributed to 
specified overseas development assistance programmes.  Alternatively, the money once 
collected could be distributed directly to a global solidarity fund which could be established 
to use the money to finance crisis and poverty relief programmes and global public goods, 
such as climate change initiatives.  Regarding enforcement, the doctrine of foreign illegality 
authorises courts to refuse to recognise contracts that violate the laws of foreign and 
friendly countries on public policy grounds.  In this case, contracts which are not stamped 
as paid under the CTT (or other approved tax) would not be recognised or enforced by the 
courts of other jurisdictions who would also be signatories to an international treaty recog-
nising enforcement of the CTT.  For contracts not stamped as paid, their lawfulness and 
enforceability would be called into doubt, thus undermining their effectiveness. 
 
3.3 A FTT on exchanged-traded, centrally cleared derivatives and other 
products  
Based on the rather low estimates of revenue to be derived from a globally coordinated CTT 
(about US$34 billion a year), it is necessary to consider a broader FTT, especially in light of 
the growing costs of financial crises and the magnitude of public resource gaps identified by 
UN and the OECD as necessary to achieve global public good objectives. A financial trans-
action tax could be extended beyond a currency transaction tax to include a broader num-
ber of transactions that would include most areas of the over-the-counter derivatives (OTC) 
market and certain exchange traded derivatives and possibly equity and bond markets.  
Although the tax could be levied at a rate similar to the CTT, it could be applied at different 
rates to reflect different risks posed by the instruments and different liquidity requirements 
in the markets in which the instruments trade.  This rationale would not apply to the CTT 
because the foreign exchange market is dominated by five main reserve currencies (along 
with twelve other currencies in the CLS system) and the FX dealing market is heavily con-
centrated and dominated by ten or twelve leading international banks.44  In contrast, deal-
ing and trading in other instruments may involve a broader number of players located in 
multiple jurisdictions.   In considering a broader FTT, Spahn (2004) has proposed that dif-
ferent tax rates apply to different counterparties (regulated banks, other financial institu-
tions and private capital, and non-financial corporations and public institutions) depending 
on their size and the systemic risk they pose.  This proposal assumes that some categories 
of counterparty (e.g. hedge funds) or transactions (e.g. certain derivative products) are 
more prone to speculative trading than others. Such a multi-tiered tax regime should aim 
to identify the desirable level of reduction in trading activities, which should be large 
enough to eliminate short-term speculative trading, but not so large as to limit unduly or 
hamper the normal functioning of markets.  
 
                                                 
44 The five main currencies which constitute foreign exchange market trading are; the US dollar 86.3%; euro 
37.0%; Japanese Yen 17.0%; UK sterling 15.0%, Swiss franc 6.8%;. The ultimate totals for all currencies would 
equal 200% to reflect the two legs of a currency trade. 
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Schulmeister (2009) has adopted a methodology to estimate how much a broad FTT can 
raise across a wide number of financial instruments (including bonds, exchange-traded, 
centrally-cleared and OTC derivatives).  His estimates incorporate conservative parameters 
for market dampening, avoidance and circumvention.  Although his estimates are rather 
cautious, they appear the most realistic of the studies reviewed and provide probably the 
most accurate estimate to date of the market impact of a FTT at tax rates of 0.5%, 0.1%, 
or 0.01%.  Based on his methodology, we consider the lowest tax rate of 0.01% on ex-
change-traded and OTC derivatives, including those related to interest rates and credit-
linked instruments because these types of instruments usually involve shorter term posi-
tions and consist of higher levels of leverage and thereby pose more risk to the financial 
system.  Based on his model, we estimate a broad-based FTT could potentially yield be-
tween US$100-US$120 billion a year.  
 
3.3.1  FTT implementation and centralised clearing of derivatives 
As with the CTT, it would be advantageous to implement the tax through centralised clear-
ing and settlement structures. Recent regulatory initiatives in Europe and the United States 
have encouraged centralised clearing of many types of standardised derivatives contracts.  
As discussed in 1.4.3, the US Congress has before it two bills that would require most 
standardised derivatives contracts to be cleared through a clearing house with some excep-
tions for non-financial firms that enter hedging transactions.  Similarly, the European 
Commission has strongly encouraged dealers in OTC credit derivatives to use centralised 
clearing to reduce systemic risk and enhance transparency.  Clearing houses are part of the 
post-trade infrastructure that supports the trading of many financial instruments, which 
usually occurs on exchanges.  They act as buyers for every seller and sellers for every 
buyer, thereby ensuring that transactions are completed, even though one of the counter-
parties may default.  The Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID) lifted the regu-
latory controls on competition between clearing houses and CCPs in Europe and liberalised 
restrictions on who could own them. Clearing houses/CCPs are usually owned by banks, 
other financial firms and increasingly by exchanges and compete with each other for the 
clearing business.  However, this has led to concerns over systemic risk that might arise 
because CCPs might be lowering their risk management standards and reducing margin 
requirements in order to attract more business.  Regulators also require that CCPs issue 
detailed statements and reports on their tariffs, charges and costs for dealers and other 
users (Barnes 2010, 1).  This type of centralised clearing network provides vital information 
to regulators and to customers about financial transactions involving their value and coun-
terparty exposures.  A CCP could also maintain and report the necessary data for a tax on 
centrally-cleared derivatives transactions to financial intermediaries and national authorities 
regarding the value of the transactions and how much tax is owed.  CCPs in Europe already 
have sophisticated reporting processes for withholding tariffs and other charges and main-
taining up-to-date data on all cleared transactions (Barnes, 2010).  These reporting and 
data management processes could be applied to calculating and reporting the applicable 
amount of tax owed for a financial transaction tax.      
 
Although there are multiple CCPs operating across European derivatives markets, they can 
arrange to exchange information on their transactions and customers on a cross-border 
basis and potentially provide the necessary data that would support a transaction tax.  This 
is occurring because interoperability among Europe’s CCPs and the new ‘user choice’ model 
involving trading platforms that offer participants the ability to clear through multiple CCPs 
has become the norm (Ibid.).  Indeed, the growing interoperability between CCPs (clearing 
houses) provides the institutional framework to make collecting a FTT on derivatives trans-
actions a practical proposition.  Similar institutional developments are occurring in the US 
where a regulatory initiative in February 2009 involving supervisors from regulatory agen-
cies with direct authority over one or more of the existing or proposed credit-default swap 
central counterparties discussed possible information sharing arrangements and other 
methods of cooperation within the regulatory community.   
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In September 2009, the group of regulators announced the establishment of the OTC De-
rivatives Regulators’ Forum (the “Forum”) to provide regulators and central banks from 
other countries with a means to cooperate, exchange views and share information related 
to OTC derivatives, CCPs and trade repositories.   
 
In addition, the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) Trade Information 
Warehouse for credit derivatives (the "Warehouse") is a user-governed, not-for-profit co-
operative that provides a registry of the details of almost all outstanding credit default 
swaps traded globally. As of March 2010 the Warehouse held data on approximately 2.3 
million contracts from OTC  counterparties located in 52 countries, covering credit obliga-
tions of entities located in more than 90 countries around the world. 
 
Centralised clearing has therefore resulted in consolidated data bases on all counterparties 
along with the value and type of derivatives transactions.  This constitutes an important 
source of information that can make it possible to administer and monitor the application of 
a financial transaction tax on these types of instruments and ensure that the appropriate 
amount is collected.  It is worth noting that the task of regulators in reviewing CDS data 
would be very difficult were there multiple warehouses for credit derivative data divided by 
geography, but this data in the case of OTC derivatives has been centralised with a clearing 
house and can be maintained if necessary for assessment and collection of a tax. 
 
Based on the above, a transaction tax on either exchange traded derivatives and/or deriva-
tives that are centrally cleared would be possible to administer at a basic level without 
great complexity, but would need to be phased in over time as centralised clearing extends 
its coverage over most OTC derivatives transactions.  We therefore recommend this tax as 
an option for EU policymakers after further consolidation of centralised clearing of deriva-
tives transactions.  
 
3.4 A bank balance sheet/profits tax  
Some countries have experienced mixed results after adopting a financial transaction tax.  
Sweden adopted a financial transaction tax in the mid 1990s that applied to all securities 
transactions – both equity and debt instruments.  The result of the financial transaction 
levy was that much of the securities trading activity in Sweden moved to London and other 
financial centres.45  Because the FTT led to substantial volumes of trading activity migrating 
to other jurisdictions, Sweden is now urging other G20 countries not to adopt a FTT and 
instead to adopt a levy on banks’ balance sheets.  Sweden adopted a so-called ‘stability fee’ 
in 2009 that was a direct levy on Swedish banks that provided a fund to pay for the bailout 
of any Swedish bank.  The Swedish stability fee on banks and credit institutions now serves 
as a model for other countries.  The Obama administration proposed a similar fee in March 
2010 that it calls a ‘responsibility fee’ to be imposed on the largest US banks in order to 
repay US taxpayers for the costs of the US bank bailout programme.  The Swedish levies 
are allocated to a stability fund managed by the Swedish National Debt Office. The gov-
ernment plans to continue levying the fee over a period of fifteen years until the revenue 
generated reaches 2.5% of Swedish GDP.46  Banks will be required to pay the levy on an 
annual basis at a rate of 0.018% of each institution’s liabilities, excluding equity capital and 
certain subordinated debt, based on audited balance sheets.  Banks are not expected to 
make their first payments into the fund until 2010 after the balance sheets are audited and 
the government has injected an initial 15 billion kronor into the fund.  Beginning in 2011, 
the bank levy will increase to 0.036 percent of liabilities with the government planning to 
introduce a weighted charge as well.  Banks with riskier balance sheets would pay a higher 
percentage.   
                                                 
45 See Letter of Anders Borg, Finance Minister of Sweden, (20 Jan. 2010). 
46 The Swedish government estimates that 2.5% of GDP to be the cost that a full-scale banking crisis would costs 
the Swedish economy.  
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Such a tax on bank liabilities may not however address some types of excessive bank risk-
taking and may result in banks being double-charged on their liabilities if they have retail 
or wholesale deposits which often require reserve requirements at the central bank. 
 
Recently, other countries – including Germany - have adopted stability taxes on bank non-
retail deposit liabilities.  The G20 and the Financial Stability Board are reviewing this type of 
tax.  Other bank balance sheet taxes might include a tax on risky assets or on remunera-
tion packages that are viewed to encourage excessive risk-taking.  In our view, however, 
we do not recommend a global tax on bank balance sheets because it would potentially 
impose serious financing costs on banks in developing and emerging market economies.  In 
addition, such a tax might impose disproportionate cost on countries with bank-led financial 
systems.  However, developed countries should have the option of imposing these taxes 
and coordinating their application with other jurisdictions, including by extraterritorial 
means if necessary.      
 
3.5 Legal obstacles to implementation  
3.5.1 National sovereignty  
The adoption of a financial tax raises not only economic issues regarding who bears the 
cost and the impact of the tax on liquidity, innovation, and risk distribution, but also raises 
important issues regarding national sovereignty and the authority of nation states to im-
pose taxes and to recognise and enforce the taxes imposed by other jurisdictions.  The in-
ternational legal principle known as the ‘revenue rule’ prohibits states in the absence of a 
treaty obligation to the contrary from enforcing or recognising the revenue or tax laws of 
other states.47  The effective application of a FTT and/or CTT in globalised and liberalised 
financial markets will require universal application and therefore necessarily involve the 
leading jurisdictions and states which issue the main reserve currencies to enter into a 
network of bilateral treaties or a multilateral treaty that recognises the application of the 
tax by the other signatory states.  It will also be necessary for the 17 states which issue 
the main reserve currencies to require that financial transactions and currency transactions 
using their currencies are not legally enforceable in their domestic courts unless the parties 
can demonstrate that the relevant contract has been stamped ‘paid.’  International legal 
issues must also be addressed as well including whether the Organisation for Economic and 
Development (OECD) should adopt a multilateral model treaty or model bilateral treaty to 
authorise countries, especially those with reserve currencies and financial centres, to ex-
change data on all relevant transactions and parties so that the tax can be applied effec-
tively.    
 
3.5.2 EU free movement of capital 
The adoption of a FTT and/or CTT in Europe will raise significant legal issues under the EU 
Treaty’s (TFEU’s) principles on free movement of capital. Article 63 (1) & (2) of the Lisbon 
Treaty prohibits ‘all restrictions on the movement of capital’ and ‘payments’ between 
‘member states and between member states and third countries’.48  EU treaty articles have 
horizontal and vertical direct effect against member states and private parties.  The appli-
cation of a CTT in Europe would have important legal ramifications because it is a poten-
tially discriminatory limitation on the free movement of capital.   
 
47 The English courts enunciated this principle in Holman v. Johnson (1775) 98 Eng Rep. 1120(Lord Mansfield 
observed in obiter dicta that ‘[f]or no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another’).      
48 Article 63 (1) & (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty) states: 
 (1) Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions 
on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries 
shall be prohibited. 
(2) Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions 
On payments between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be pro-
hibited. 
See also European Commission Communication discussing effect of prohibitions (Commission 2010, 25-26). 
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This would be the case regardless of whether it was imposed by a national authority, cen-
tral bank or non-state entity such as the CLS Bank because it would apply to transactions 
involving payments using different currencies issued by member states and on transactions 
involving payments using a currency issued by an EU state and that of a third country.  
Member states might argue that such a restriction on free movement of capital can be jus-
tified on public policy grounds or as a matter of overriding public security (art. 65 (1)(b)) 
because it aims to promote prudential regulatory objectives and pay for European and 
global public goods.  Nevertheless, these exceptions permitting restrictions on the free 
movement of capital can not be arbitrarily discriminatory between member states or dis-
proportionate in their application. This raises important legal obstacles to the CTT because 
it would prima facie discriminate against all transactions involving EU member countries 
which use different currencies (ie., between euro and non-eurozone countries) compared to 
those cross-border transactions within the eurozone using only the euro.49  Regarding pro-
portionality, it could be argued that EU states alternatively could raise a similar amount of 
revenue by imposing non-discriminatory taxes on the exchange traded and/or centrally 
cleared derivatives markets or on bank balance sheets or on commodities futures contracts 
that would not violate a treaty freedom, rather than imposing a CTT that would arguably 
violate the free movement of capital in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner within the 
Union.  Nevertheless, the CTT’s regulatory objective of reducing excessive foreign exchange 
transactions, providing a fund to pay for the social costs of a crisis, and raising revenue for 
European and global public goods provides a strong public policy and security rationale that 
could justify its limitation on the free movement of capital.  
   
                                                 
49 The European Commission has made this argument by stating that the CTL ‘could represent a restriction of the 
free movement of capital and payments (Article 63)’ and that even if a ‘justification sufficient for purposes of the 
Treaty could be found’ (raising money for global public goods) ‘that requirement could not explain why transac-
tions involving countries with different currencies would be treated less favourably than those involving only one 
currency’. Moreover, the Commission asserts that the CTL is ‘disproportionate as funds could alternatively be 
raised by other means of budget attribution without affecting a basic freedom of the Treaty and, in any event, 
because the scope of the tax would be unrelated to the risks to be covered by the t ax revenue raised.’ (Commis-
sion, 2010, 26).       
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4.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
We call for an enhanced approach to regulation and supervision that monitors and 
assesses r isk across  mark ets and at th e level of the fin ancial system. We also 
identify the desirability of providing fo r a sustainable and dependable source of 
finance to s upport prudential r egulatory ob jectives wh ilst also p roviding addi-
tional financing for global an d European public goods in a manner which is com-
plementary to other regulatory objectives.   
 
We argue that an effective macro-prudential regime will need to impose strict leverage ra-
tios on banks and financial firms and possibly quantitative leverage caps for the broader 
financial system.  Other aspects of macro-prudential regulation which we recommend for 
the EU include counter-cyclical regulatory capital buffers for banks that would be deter-
mined in part by the business and economic cycle.  Also, maturity mismatches in wholesale 
funding for financial institutions should be subject to limitations and non-deposit liabilities 
should be kept within a strict ratio of total liabilities.  Although the securitisation market is 
vital in many developed countries for economic recovery, certain synthetic instruments 
should be subject to higher capital charges and standardised credit risk transfer instru-
ments should be migrated onto clearing houses where they would be subject to lower capi-
tal charges than if they were traded in the over-the-counter market.     
 
The amended version of Basel II will probably result in regulatory capital having a more 
harmonised definition and consisting mainly of tangible common equity.  This will have a 
disproportionate effect on the cost of bank capital raising in most EU countries and may 
have the effect of limiting the economic recovery.  Therefore, it is essential that such  
bank capit al re forms be acc ompanied by rule-based count er-cyclical c apital r e-
quirements that permit banks to hold lower levels of regulatory capital while their 
economies  are in re cession and to hol d a pr oportionately higher percentage o f 
tier one capital after the recovery has begun.   
 
The new EU institutional framework is intended to recognise the interdependence between 
micro- and macro-prudential risks across EU financial markets and the need to be account-
able to the views of market participants and all EU stakeholders, including financial institu-
tions, investors and consumers. We recommen d however th at effecti ve EU crisis  
management necessitates reforms of the EU  bank resolution regime, the creation 
of an EU solidarity fund that would provide liquidity assistance to sovereign debt-
ors during a crisis that could be paid for by a small tax on EU sover eign bond is-
suance, and by c onsideration of methods by whic h discretionary macroeconomic 
policy might be conducted in the event of severe crises.  
 
We are concerned that financial institutions will find ways to circumvent these requirements 
and will adopt innovations that will ultimately expose the system to new and more virulent 
forms of systemic risk.  Indeed, modern history demonstrates that financial crises are re-
current, especially in liberalised financial markets, and will continue to impose substantial 
costs on taxpayers and society.  Therefore, dependable and sustainable funding sources in 
the financial sector should be identified to help absorb these costs in a manner that sup-
ports prudential regulatory objectives and achieves broader social and public goods.  More-
over, the global financial crisis has imposed huge economic and social costs across devel-
oped and developing countries, with the burden falling disproportionately on the poorest.  
The crisis has made it extremely difficult for developed countries to honour their pledges 
taken at the Gleneagles G7 Summit in 2005 to increase their financial support for global 
public goods and in particular to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
 
We recommend therefore that international standard setting bodies such as th e 
Basel Committee examine certain financial transaction taxes as a prudential regu-
latory measure to limit excessive risk-taking and as a crisis management measure 
to help st ates pay for the tremen dous so cial costs caused by financ ial crises.   
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These taxes can take various forms, and we compare several options, including a currency 
transaction tax, a broader tax on OTC and exchange-traded instruments, and for some 
countries who have suffered bank bailout problems a tax on bank balance sheets and prof-
its.  We compare the advantages and disadvantages of each tax and make recommenda-
tions based on whether these taxes meet the following criteria:  1) uses existing clearing 
and settlement infrastructure and administrative transparency in implementation; 2) the 
tax level should achieve a balance of economic benefits in terms of risk mitigation that does 
not significantly distort the market nor undermine liquidity; 3) yet generates substantial 
revenue to pay for public goods; and 4) is not unlawfully discriminatory under EU or inter-
national law.  Practically, this means that the tax would have to be levied at a very low rate 
not to significantly distort the market and would have to be imposed almost universally on 
transactions that constitute a large and growing part of the financial markets in order to 
collect substantial and sustainable revenue.  Also, the most efficient and effective mode of 
collection would have to be through national authorities and/or central banks.  The data on 
taxable transactions could be collected and managed by payment information intermediar-
ies such as SWIFT.  Clearing houses and settlement institutions could also withhold taxes 
on transactions that take place on their systems and pass on to national authorities.   
These criteria should guide policymakers in considering what taxes would be most appro-
priate for their jurisdictions, but we recommend that policymakers agree on a universal 
approach through an international treaty or model bilateral treaties so that whatever fi-
nancing mechanism is adopted it can be done so in a way that is coordinated between na-
tional authorities with adequate oversight and surveillance that minimises arbitrage and 
circumvention. 
 
We conclude that the currency transaction tax (CTT) most effectively satisfies the 
above criteria and could be used to promot e prudential regulatory objectives as 
well as to generate substantial revenue for public goods both in Europe and inter-
nationally.  Although subject to some uncertainty under EU law, the CTT would, if applied 
to the leading reserve currencies, yield an estimated US$33.41 billion a year.  This esti-
mate is based on a cautious view of the effects of circumvention and market dampening 
due to the tax.  The adoption would take an important step towards limiting the dispropor-
tionate growth of financial transactions relative to overall economic growth while generating 
revenue to assist developed countries in meeting their Millennium Development Goal com-
mitments and paying for other global public goods such as climate change. In recommend-
ing the CTT, we also believe that a broader FTT on OTC and exchange-traded derivative 
instruments and the broader securities markets could generate significant additional reve-
nue, but that such a tax on a broad area of the financial markets should be phased in over 
time with a closer analysis of the incidence of the tax.     
 
We recommend that the CTT be implemen ted through the Continuous Link Settle-
ment System and the Continuous Link Settlement Bank and that other FTTs can be 
similarly implemented through centralised clearing houses.  The CLS system acts as 
a trusted third party between two counterparty financial institutions in a foreign exchange 
transaction.  CLS bank is well situated to monitor the wholesale transactions between the 
leading banks and foreign exchange dealers and could monitor, report and/or withhold the 
relevant tax on settled foreign exchange transactions. Central banks may also play a role in 
assisting CLS bank in monitoring the transactions to be taxed and providing information to 
national tax authorities.  Effective implementation of the CTT will require that the CLS bank 
work closely with the national central banks in monitoring the tax through their real-time 
gross settlement systems.   
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Similarly, centralised clearing of derivatives transactions will provide the institutional 
framework for effective monitoring and implementation of a transaction tax on financial 
instruments that are cleared or exchange traded.  Future regulatory reforms will provide 
incentives such as lower capital charges for intermediaries to clear their derivatives trades 
through CCPs and clearing houses and therefore a small transaction of tax of 0.01% (1 ba-
sis point) or 0.005% (one-half basis point) would be a small price to pay for the cost sav-
ings and reduced risk of clearing trades through clearing houses.     
 
We recommend that some of t he revenue from t hese taxes be allocated through 
existing international aid bodies to su pplement overseas development assistance 
and to help pay for public g oods for the world’s poorest countries and Europe’s 
poorest regions.     
 
A well-designed financial transaction tax can be a source of innovative financing that can 
enhance market efficiency as well as generate substantial revenue to pay for social and 
economic development.  FTTs/CTTs constitute a potentially revolutionary solidarity mecha-
nism that can bind the prospects of the poorest in developing countries and emerging mar-
kets with those of the richest in developed countries, especially helping the governments of 
the poor countries who have suffered so much in the recent crisis. FTTs/CTTs can also play 
an important role as an alternative regulatory measure to limit excessive risk-taking and 
reduce socially useless transactions.  These taxes can have a dual regulatory and economic 
development objective that can potentially enhance financial stability while providing sus-
tainable funds for economic and social development in Europe and globally.      
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ANNEXES 
Annex I 
An example of how traditional correspondent banking settles FX trades 
 
 
 
Data source: BIS 2009 
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Annex II 
 
 
  
CLS 
Traditional 
corresponding 
banking 
Bilateral 
netting 
(effect) 
Other set-
tlement 
methods 
USD 55 31 8 6 
EUR 58 29 7 5 
JPY 62 24 8 6 
GBP 54 32 9 4 
CHF 58 26 8 7 
AUD 58 30 8 3 
CAD 38 43 13 6 
SEK 66 22 6 6 
HKD 47 46 1 6 
NOK 70 22 4 4 
KRW 30 65 2 3 
NZD 59 30 7 4 
SGD 52 42 3 2 
DKK 74 20 2 4 
ZAR 58 33 6 3 
All other - 84 13 3 
Total 55 32 8 5 
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Annex III  
Largest foreign exchange dealers 
% of overall volume, May 2009 
Deutsche Bank 21.0 
UBS AG 14.6 
Barclays Capital 10.5 
Royal Bank of Scotland 8.2 
Citigroup 7.3 
JP Morgan 5.4 
HSBC 4.1 
Goldman Sachs 3.4 
Credit Suisse 3.1 
BNP Paribas 2.3 
Other 20.1 
Source: Euromoney FX survey   
 
 
Annex IV 
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Annex V – What is CLS Bank? 
In 2002, central banks and leading private banks established a centralised international 
settlement system for foreign exchange trading by creating the Continuous Link Settlement 
System (CLS) and the Continuous Link Settlement Bank International (CLS Bank). This 
centralised foreign exchange settlement system involved the creation of a comprehensive 
payment v payment service for settling foreign exchange transactions that reduces settle-
ment or principal risk and counterparty credit risk among participating financial intermedi-
aries. The CLS Bank holds the deposits of its 59 member banks denominated in the 17 cur-
rencies of its participating central banks (the leading reserve currencies) in the CLS system 
so that if one member bank cannot fulfil its counterparty obligation to another CLS mem-
ber, then the CLS bank can draw on the defaulting member’s relevant currency deposit to 
cover the obligation owed to the non-defaulting CLS member.   Also, the CLS Bank is used 
by individual institutions to improve their control and monitoring of foreign exchange expo-
sures, while central banks have supported the CLS Bank by enhancing their payment and 
liquidity facilities and making them available to the CLS Bank. CLS Bank is an Edge Act 
Corporation under US federal banking law and authorised to conduct international banking 
business, including, but not limited to, settling foreign exchange transactions.  The CLS 
System consists of its holding company, CLS Group Holdings AG, which has two main oper-
ating subsidiaries. 1) CLS Bank International (‘CLS Bank’), and 2) CLS Services, Ltd., a 
company organised under the UK Companies Act 2006 with principal place of business in 
London and which provides technical services to CLS Bank.  CLS Bank observes the Core 
Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems published by the Committee on 
Payment and Settlement Systems of the central banks of the G10 countries (CPSS). The 
directors of CLS Group Holdings are elected by CLS Group shareholders. 
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Annex VI – Global OTC derivatives market  
To consider the breadth and scope of the global OTC market and the potential for applying 
a transaction tax to this market, the data below provide the gross market value in trillions 
of US$ on a daily basis.  In considering whether to impose a tax on the OTC market, we 
consider the BIS’s estimates of how the volume of the OTC market has grown in recent 
years.  Between 2004 and April 2009, the average daily turnover in the OTC market across 
all asset classes increased dramatically from about US$8,000 billion a day to about 
US$23,500 billion a day. See also data in BIS Triennial Survey (2007).  As the chart indi-
cates, interest rate contracts are the largest part of the OTC market amounting approxi-
mately to US$13,500 billion a day (about 60% of the total OTC market). 
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